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LITIGATION REALITIES REDUX
Kevin M. Clermont*
Both summarizing recent empiricalwork andpresenting new observations
on each of the six phases of a civil lawsuit (forum, pretrial,settlement, trial,
judgment, and appeal), the author stresses the needs for and benefits from
understanding and using empirical methods in the study and reform of the
adjudicatory system's operation.
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INTRODUCTION

A half-dozen years ago, Ted Eisenberg and I started our article
entitled Litigation Realities' with a quotation of Louis XVI: his journal
entry for July 14, 1789, was "Nothing."2 Our point was that the modern lawyer who ignores empirical research, even though law has long
ignored empirical methods, risks giving in retrospect the very same
impression as the French king gave. From that starting point, our article tried to explain empirical methods and map an empirical agenda.
Well, a new age has since dawned. The recent years have seen
tremendous advances in empirical studies. Much remains to do, of
course. But, as the even earlier French proverb put it (although
arguably with inaccuracy under some circumstances), "Something is
'3
better than nothing.
I propose in this Article to discuss anew what all of us are now
learning about litigation, thanks to this increasing use of empirical
methods. I shall again treat separately the six phases of a lawsuit:
forum selection, pretrial practice, settlement process, trial practice,
1 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 120 (2002).
2 See Duc DE CASTRIES, L'AGONIE DE LA ROYAUTt 193 (1959). But cf. PAUL
GIRAULT DE COURSAC

&

PIERRETTE GIRAULT DE COURSAC, ENTRETIENS SUR Louis

16, at

144-45 (1990) (explaining that, in actuality, this much-maligned monarch was noting
only that there had been no hunt that day).
3 See THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 620 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006) (translating "mieulx vault aucun bien que neant," from the early fifteenth century). Frederick
Mosteller, as quoted in Time magazine, observed: "It is easy to lie with statistics, but
easier to lie without them." Melissa August et al., Milestones, TIME, Aug. 7, 2006, at 23,
23. Nevertheless, a major lesson from the present Article is that before drawing conclusions, the researcher should seek out as many pieces of the puzzle as possibleusing data from as many years as possible, and from as many settings as possible (different case categories, civil and noncivil proceedings, state and federal forums, U.S.
and foreign settings). See, e.g., Dan Childs et al., Studies Gone Wild: Death by Shower
Curtain?, ABC NEWS, June 12, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=50571
41&page=l ("The group tested a total of five shower curtains, of which only one
shower curtain-not one brand; one curtain-was subjected to complete testing for
chemicals in its composition, as well as those it released into the air-a phenomenon
known as 'off-gassing.'").
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judgment entry, and appellate practice. For each, I shall describe
what I see as important insights from recent empirical publications,
while also providing new data on the realities of that phase. As I shall
demonstrate, the last half-dozen years have altered our earlier article's
understanding of some features of litigation, which was to be expected
given that any initial steps into a new field of study must be tentative
ones. Thus, the emphasis in this redoing of Litigation Realities, as compared to the original, will appropriately be less on yesterday's news of
empirical methods 4 and more on recent empirical results.
I.
A.

FORUM

Forum Selection

The name of the game is forum shopping, as many have observed
elsewhere. 5 Lawyers all know this and have lived by it forever. The
contribution of recent empirical research, besides confirming the
existence of the phenomenon, has been to show that all of those lawyers were not wasting their clients' money on forum fights-because,
in fact, forum matters. Forum is worth fighting over because outcome
often turns on forum, as I shall explain in the next subpart.
Forum selection accordingly remains extraordinarily important
in the American civil litigation system. Today, after perhaps some initial skirmishing, most cases settle, while few cases reach trial. 6 Yet all
cases entail forum selection. The plaintiffs opening moves include
4 See also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Foreigners'Fatein America's
Courts: EmpiricalLegal Research, 1 ACADEMIA SINICA L.J. 237, 239-50 (2007), availableat
http://empirical.law.cornell.edu/articles/sinica.pdf (discussing the impact of empirical research on the law).
5 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of ForumShopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1995) (noting that forum selection "has a
major impact on outcome"); see also Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping:
A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79 (1999) (stressing the benefits of
forum shopping); Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333 (2006)
(defending forum shopping as a legitimate tactic when the law authorizes bringing a
lawsuit in more than one forum); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and
Internationa 63 TUL. L. REV. 553, 570 (1989) ("[N]ot all forum shopping merits condemnation."); Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What's Wrong with That?, 24 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 25, 33-50 (2005) (distinguishing permissible from impermissible forum shopping); James E. Pfander, Forum Shopping and the Infrastructure of Federalism, 17 TEMP.
POL. & Cnr. RTS. L. REV. 355, 355 (2008) (explaining that forum shopping "ensure [s]
that firms operating through the nation must comply with relatively more pro-consumer policies at the state level"); J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and
Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 333 (1967) (criticizing forum shopping as
"a national legal pastime").
6 See infta Parts III-IV.
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shopping for the most favorable forum, be it some state's courts or the
federal system, and be it any particular venue within the jurisdiction. 7
Then, the defendant's parries and thrusts might challenge the plaintiff's choice of forum and also might include some forum shopping in
return, possibly by removal from state to federal court8 or by a motion
for change of venue. 9 As a consequence, the parties frequently dispute forum. Federal litigators, for example, deal with many more
change-of-venue motions than trials. 10 When the dust settles, the case
typically does too-but on terms that reflect the results of the shopping and skirmishing. Thus, forum selection is a critical step for litigators, and any fight over forum can be the critical dispute in the case.
When all these individual incentives cumulate, forum selection
also becomes a critical concern of the legal system as a whole. Forum
selection is very important not only to the litigator, but also to the
office lawyer who is drafting contracts with an eye toward possible
future litigation. Not surprisingly, there exists an entire treatise
devoted to the subject of forum selection.'" Moreover, the transactional costs of forum shopping, and its effects on outcome and so on
justice, should be important to society.
Removal provides a good illustration of forum selection. 12 For
background, suppose the plaintiffs commence in a state court an
action that they could instead have started in a federal district court.
All the served defendants acting together may then seek removal, subject to a few exceptions. 13 The defendants must promptly file, in the
federal district court sitting in the same locality, a notice of removal.' 4
The defendants must give the plaintiffs and the state court notification of the filing.1 5 By this activity solely on the part of the defend7
8
9

See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006) (governing venue within the federal system).
See, e.g., id. § 1441 (a) (authorizing removal generally).
See, e.g., id. § 1404(a) (authorizing transfer between districts within the federal

system).

10 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1509 n.3, reported that the numbers of
transfer motions and trials were about the same through fiscal year 1991, but since
then the number of trials has dropped precipitously. See infra note 184.
11 ROBERT C. CASAD, JURISDICTION AND FORUM SELECTION (2d ed. 2007 & Update
2008).
12 See generally KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 200-05 (2d

ed. 2009) (giving background on law of removal).
13 The most important exception to the removability of cases appears in 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006), whereby defendants cannot remove a diversity case if any

served defendant is a citizen of the forum state.
14
15

Id. § 1446(a)-(b).
Id. § 1446(d).
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ants, removal is complete. 16 The state court can proceed no further
with the action unless and until the federal district court remands it to
the state court, as upon a finding that it was by law not removable. 1 7 A
decision to remand, however, is typically not appealable.' 8
Normally, the defendants can remove only a case that the plaintiffs could have brought in federal court but instead chose to bring in
state court. Thus, the group of removed cases are ones where both
the plaintiffs and the defendants had a choice of court, but the
defendants preferred federal court and possessed the power to trump
the plaintiffs' initial choice of state court. The obvious story behind
removal, then, is one of forum selection.
What forces drive the parties' choice between state and federal
forum? It is not substantive law, as the same substantive law will apply
after removal. However, there are many other considerations that
might affect choice, according to empirical studies of attorneys' preferences.' 9 Most of these considerations group under four general
headings: expected bias against a litigant; logistical and practical concerns; perceived disparity in quality and other characteristics between
state and federal judges and between state and federal juries; and the
20
different procedures offered by one or the other court system.
What about the numbers? Although the overwhelming majority
of all U.S. cases are state cases, 21 a surprising number of those cases
are removed to federal court. Consider the data on removal
presented in Figure 1, which come from a federal database that I shall
be using for all six figures in this Article.2 2 The graph shows removal
16
17
18
19

Id.
Id.
Id. § 1447(d).
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal

Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction,83 CORNELL L. REv.

581, 599 (1998).
20 See RICHARD H.

FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCE-

DURE 221-22 (9th ed. 2007).

21
See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, AMERICAN COURTS 31-33 (2d ed. 2000); Brian J.
Ostrom et al., Examining Trial Trends in State Courts: 1976-2002, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 755, 757 (2004).
22 These data were gathered by the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts (AO), assembled by the Federal Judicial Center, and disseminated by the
Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. See Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Courts in Cyberspace, 46J. LEGAL EDUC. 94 (1996). These
data convey details of all cases terminated in the federal courts since fiscal year 1970.
When any civil case terminates in a federal district court or court of appeals, the court
clerk transmits to the AO a form containing information about the case. The forms
include, inter alia, data regarding the names of the parties, the subject matter category (the form distinguishes among some ninety categories, including specific
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over the thirty-seven-year period for which computerized data exist
and are available.2 3 The graph focuses on a particular head of federal
jurisdiction-diversityjurisdiction 24-not because the pattern appears
only there, even if it is particularly salient there, but because a single
context makes expression of analysis clearer. The upper line shows
the proportion of diversity cases that originated as removals. The
lower line shows the proportion of those removed cases that the dis25
trict court remanded.
In the original LitigationRealities, we took the data through 2000.
The resulting graph 2 6 exhibited, in its two ascending lines, a surprising time trend. It suggested a removal story of increasing use of
removal as a forum selection device and possibly increasing abuse of
removal that required more and more remands, a story that nicely
27
conformed with anecdotal impression.
Then, Professors Eisenberg and Morrison extended the graph
through 2003, showing that the numbers were staying at their elevated
branches of contract, tort, and other areas of law) and the jurisdictional basis of the
case, the case's origin in the district as original, removed, or transferred, the amount
demanded, the dates of filing and termination in the district court or the court of
appeals, the procedural stage of the case at termination, the procedural method of
disposition, and, if the court entered judgment or reached decision, the prevailing
party and the relief granted. Thus, the computerized database, compiled from these
forms, contains all of the millions of federal civil cases over many years from the
whole country. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 127-29, more fully describes
this database and its strengths and weaknesses.
23 For Figure 1, I eliminated asbestos cases from the Northern District of Ohio in
calendar year 1990 to avoid the distortion of their unusually high number. I did the
same for multidistrict product liability terminations from the Northern District of Alabama in 1998 and 1999; from the District of Minnesota and the Northern District of
Ohio in 2004; and from the District of Minnesota, the Northern District of Ohio, and
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2006 (while also eliminating over sixteen thousand reopened asbestos and diet-drug cases that were dismissed in 2006 by that last
district).
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). In rough terms, this statute extends jurisdiction to cases for more than $75,000 between citizens of different U.S. states or
between foreigners and state citizens, but it requires the diversity to be "complete,"
that is, no two opposing parties can be citizens of the same state. See Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). The Constitution would permit "minimal"
diversity, that is, the only requirement, absent a statutory restriction, is that a state
citizen and someone of different citizenship must be on opposite sides. See State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967) (upholding the interpleader statute on such basis).
25 As to the remand rate, it is reliable only from fiscal year 1979, when the AO's
coding practices made the necessary changes.
26 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 123 fig.1.
27 See id. at 122 & n.16.
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levels. 28 They observed that during the recent period in which state
tort filings noticeably decreased, the numbers of both tort and other
diversity cases that rested on removal were steadily or even markedly
increasing, with their combined percentage of the whole diversity
docket mounting well over 30%.29 Meanwhile, the percentage of
those removed cases that the federal courts remanded to state court
30
had climbed toward 20%, which raised even sharper concerns.
These remands, by definition, involved erroneous removal, the correction of which very often involves difficult questions of fact and law and
almost always involves considerable time and expense that represent a
deadweight loss to the system and the parties. Out of a belief that the
increase in erroneous removal might entail an increase in abusive
removal, they ended by suggesting possible reform that would provide
31
for more frequent fee-shifting against the remanded defendant.
A call to action may have been premature. Figure 1 now goes
through 2006. It shows that a more modest upward trend persists for
removal 32 but the remand trend has unexpectedly reversed.3 3 This
very recent dive in remand rate is hard to explain. Perhaps the remov28 Theodore Eisenberg & Trevor W. Morrison, Overlooked in the Tort Reform Debate:
The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 565 fig.2, 566 fig.4
(2005). Their article triggered an interesting debate on TortsProf Blog, Abusive
Removals (updated), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/tortsprof/2006/1O/abusiveremoval.html (Oct. 10, 2006). Ted Frank, Director of the American Enterprise Institute Legal Center, there says: "I've been very disappointed in empirical legal work.
[It] usually consist[s] of a study that performs technically accurate counting of statistics, and then wild jumps to conclusions that coincidentally correspond to the
authors' biases without acknowledgement of the limits of the data." Id. (Oct. 10,
2006, 17:10 EST). But the only point such critics made is that "erroneous removal"
means no more than removals that the system has determined were in error and so
require remand, an obvious point on which Eisenberg and Morrison had been perfectly explicit.
29 Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 28, at 564.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 561, 576. But cf Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141
(2005) (reading narrowly the authority in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to award 'just costs" for
improper removal relatively).
32 The upswing in the removal rate could be attributable in part to the statutory
amendments in 1988 that changed removal from a relatively burdensome petitionand-bond process to a simple notice-of-removal scheme that facilitates defendants'
forum shopping. See Christopher Terranova, ErroneousRemoval as a Tool for Silent Tort
Reform: An Empirical Analysis of Fee Awards and FraudulentJoinder, 44 WiLAmETrE L.
RE-zv. 799, 805-09 (2008) (observing the recent dive in remand rate, but not knowing
how to explain it even after extensive analysis; also making the point that the observed
pattern does not result from using termination data, even though the quickly terminated remand cases do not perfectly align year-by-year with the more slowly terminated nonremand cases). However, the transfer rate for federal cases has shown a
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ing defendants are adjusting to the new regime, so that remand rates
can return to their historic level of around 10% of the cases removed.
1:

FIGuRE

REMOVAL AND REMAND RATES IN FEDERAL DivERsim' CASES
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B.

Remand rate

Forum Effect

Let me return to the effect of forum selection on the outcome of
cases, and let me define "win rate" as the fraction of plaintiff wins
among all judgments for either plaintiff or defendant.3 4 Application
of empirical methods can then reveal the effect of forum in the consimilar increase over recent decades, thus implying a more generic cause for
increased forum shopping. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1526-29.
33 The new trend seems pervasive. The downward trend prevails, most often in a
statistically significant way, in every circuit since 2001, except the First Circuit where it
did not appear until 2003. It prevails, most often in a statistically significant way, in
each case grouping (contract, real property, personal injury torts, product liability,
personal property torts, and statutory actions).
34 For present purposes, I narrow the AO definition ofjudgments to include only
those cases where the data indicate a win by plaintiff or defendant, not by both or by
an unknown party. Note, however, that these judgments comprise much more than
trial outcomes: for AO purposes, judgments might be the result of adjudication, consent, or default, although they normally do not include voluntary dismissals or dismissals for lack of prosecution.
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text of removal, 35 as well as in the analogous context of transfer of
36
venue between federal district courts.
Our removal article showed that plaintiffs' win rates in removed
cases are very low, compared to original cases in federal court and to
state cases. For example, the win rate in original diversity cases is
71%, but for removed diversity cases only 34%.37 The explanation
could be the ready one based on the purpose of removal: the defendants thereby defeat the plaintiffs' forum advantage and shift the
biases, inconveniences, court quality, and procedural law in the
defendants' favor. Alternatively, the explanation might lie not in
forum impact but instead in case selection: removed cases may simply
be a set of weak cases (1) involving out-of-state defendants who have
satisfied or settled all but plaintiffs' weakest cases or (2) involving
plaintiffs' attorneys who have demonstrated their incompetence by
not avoiding removal. Our analysis indicated that both forum impact
and case selection are at work. After a regression controlling for many
case variables, which is a statistical technique that helps to account for
differences among the cases and thus to neutralize the case-selection
effect, the impact of removal remains sizable and significant. Forum
really does affect outcome, with removal taking the defendant to a
much more favorable forum. The statistical analysis indicates a
residual removal effect for diversity cases that would reduce 50% odds
for plaintiff to about 39%.38 This eleven point reduction from even
odds represents the impact of a federal forum on the case-the
39
removal effect.
We also studied the transfer effect, whereby the win rate drops
markedly after transfer of venue between federal districts. Plaintiffs'
win rate in all federal civil cases drops from 58%, calculated for cases
in which there is no transfer, to 29% in transferred cases. 40 For transfer, the loss of a favorable forum, with the result of a strongly shifted
balance of inconveniences and a shift of local biases, seems to be the
primary explanation, because we were able more easily to discount
explanations based on differences in the strength of nontransferred
35 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 19, 592-607.
36 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supranote 5, at 1511-30; see also Kevin M. Clermont
& Theodore Eisenberg, Simplifying the Choice of Forum: A Reply, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1551
(1997) (using an empirical study to examine the effects of transfer of venue on case
outcomes).
37 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 593.
38 Id. at 606.
39 Id. at 606-07.
40 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1512.
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and transferred cases. 4 1 That is, the win rate declines largely because
the plaintiffs have lost a forum advantage. The plaintiffs odds would
drop after transfer of venue from 50% to 40%, after controlling for all
42
available variables.
The comparison of removal and transfer suggests a consistent
forum effect, whereby the plaintiffs' loss of forum advantage by removal
or transfer reduces their chance of winning by about one-fifth. This
empirical finding is important, even if it seems an unsurprising confirmation of what most lawyers already knew: the name of the game
indeed is forum shopping.
Policymakers, in addition to practitioners, obviously take interest
in this finding. For example, Congress recently enacted the Class
Action Fairness Act (CAFA),43 the single most important piece of class
action legislation in the nation's history. The Republican Congress
gave CAFA a broad scope covering interstate class actions, with the
expressed intent of defeating plaintiff lawyers' manipulation of state
courts. 44 When Republican President George W. Bush signed it into
law, he declared that it "marks a critical step toward ending the lawsuit
culture in our country."45 The statute's method was to funnel more
class actions away from the state courts and into the federal courts,
and perhaps thereby to discourage class actions.
Most important for present purposes was CAFA's expansion of
federal subject matter jurisdiction for class actions. Congress
bestowed original jurisdiction on the federal district courts for sizable
multistate class actions, generally those in which the plaintiff class contains at least 100 members and their claims aggregated together
41 Id. at 1514.
42 Cf Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 603 n.67 (showing the transfer
effect, which reduced 50% odds to 38% for diversity cases).
43 Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C.). See generally GEORGENE M. VAIRO, CLAss ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005 (2005)
(giving background on CAFA). For a different but even more astounding example of
policymakers' interest in the effect of forum on outcome, see Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates, and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097, 1134-37 (2008) (calling for more empirical research to
rebut tort reform propaganda).
44 See 7A CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1756.2 (3d ed. 2005 & Supp. 2008) (describing Congress' goal of preventing litigation abuse through CAFA).
45 Joel Roberts, Lawsuit Limits Become Law, CBS NEws, Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.
cbsnews.com/stories/2005/02/11 /politics/main673159.shtml
(quoting President
George W. Bush); see also Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action FairnessAct in Perspective: The Old and the New in FederalJurisdictionalReform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823,
1861-63, 1867 (2008) (stressing partisan support for CAFA).
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exceed $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs; the statute does not
require complete diversity, but rather minimal diversity, which means
that only one plaintiff member of the class must differ in citizenship
from any one defendant. 4 6 Congress further provided that any defendant can remove a class action from state court to the local federal
district court if the action would be within the original federal jurisdiction; the statute goes on to say that the removing defendant can be a
local citizen and need not seek the consent of the other defendants,
47
and that any decision as to remand is immediately appealable.
We recently conducted an empirical study of all online judicial
opinions on CAFA in order to gauge judicial activity and receptivity in48
regard to this legislative attempt to tilt the field in defendants' favor.
We found that CAFA has produced an unusually large amount of litigation in its short life. 49 The cases were varied, of course, but most

typically the federal decision involved a removed contract case, with
the dispute turning on CAFA's effective date or on federal jurisdiction.5 0 More interesting, we saw wise but value-laden resistance to
CAFA by federal trial and appellate judges. 51 By an almost two-to-one
rate, the judges construed or applied it in a way that narrowed rather
than broadened it, although Republican male judges stood out as
bucking the trend. 52 In general, the federal judiciary has not warmly
embraced the statute, dampening the early hopes of overly enthusiastic removers.
II.

A.

PRETRIAL

Steps to Termination

The pretrial phase divides into case exposition and case disposition. These two involve both devices driven in the main by the parties'
own efforts and also devices driven in the main by forces external to
the parties. Case exposition's internal devices are pleading and disclosure, while its external devices are discovery and conference. Case dispo46 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d) (2006); see also supra note 24 (describing the difference
between complete and minimal diversity).
47 28 U.S.C. § 1453 (2006); see also supra notes 13, 18 and accompanying text
(discussing the non-CAFA requirement of having all defendants agree on removal
and the nonappealability of remand orders).
48 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFAJudicata: A Tale of Waste and
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2008). On the dangers of limiting study to such
"published" opinions, see id. at 1559-60, 1562-63.
49 Id. at 1560.
50 Id. at 1565.
51 Id. at 1579-84.
52 As to this surprising result, see id. at 1584-91.
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sition's internal devices comprise the processes of settlement, and its
external devices comprise the methods of summary adjudication by
motion. I shall run quickly through those six steps of pretrial.
1. Pleading
The content of the pleadings was long a controversial subject in
Anglo-American practice. 53 The older view held that pleadings must
accomplish a great deal, laying out the issues in dispute and stating
the facts in considerable detail. 54 But holders of this view asked too
much of the pleading step, which consequently became the center of
legal attention, ended up all too often mired down in battles over
technicalities, and provided the vehicle for monumental abuse. 55
Modern practice has shifted forward most of the former functions of
pleadings, moving them into the steps of disclosure, discovery, pretrial
conference, summary judgment, and trial. The motivating theory was
that these later steps can more efficiently and fairly handle functions
such as narrowing issues and revealing facts, and thus the whole system can better deliver a proper decision on the merits. 56 Accordingly,

most people came to accept that the main task of pleadings is to give
the adversary (and the court and the public) fair notice of the
57
pleader's contentions.
Despite this modern prevalence of notice pleading, disagreement
on the critical question of how pleading should proceed is now
recommencing. 58 Lower federal courts of late have been requiring
greater detail in pleading, or so-called heightened pleading. 59 The
53 See CLERMONT, supra note 12, at 37-54.
54 See Edward Cavanagh, PleadingRules in Antitrust Cases: A Return to Fact Pleading?, 21 REV. LITIG. 1, 1-2 (2002).
55 See Mark D. Robins, The Resurgence and Limits of the Demurrer,27 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 637, 642 n.24 (1993).
56 See Douglas A. Blaze, Presumed Frivolous:Application of Stringent PleadingRequirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 935, 942 (1990).
57 See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957) ("[W]e have no doubt that
petitioners' complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the respondents fair
notice of its basis."), abrogated by Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
58 Disagreement prevails even within families, as my wife, Emily Sherwin, can
attest. Compare Emily Sherwin, The Story of Conley: Precedent by Accident, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIEs 295, 317-20 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 2d ed. 2008) (criticizing lenient
pleading rules), and Emily Sherwin, The Jurisprudence of Pleading: Rights, Rules, and
Conley v. Gibson, 52 How. L.J. 73 (2008) (same), with CLERMONT, supra note 12, at
37-41 (favoring a move toward even purer notice pleading).
59 See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading,81 TEX. L. REx,. 551, 574-82
(2002); Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,45 ARiz. L. REv. 987,
1002-09 (2003); Richard L. Marcus, The Puzzling Persistence of PleadingPractice,76 TEX.
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Supreme Court has twice batted down this change for being unauthorized by the Federal Rules. 60 Yet change keeps coming-even though
there have been no empirical studies whatsoever on the virtues of case
61
exposition through pleading.
The shot-in-the-dark adjudication in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly62 nicely represents recent "reform" of pleading. In that case,
telephone and internet subscribers brought a class action against the
telecommunications giants, claiming an illegal conspiracy in restraint
of trade. 63 Under antitrust law, however, parallel and even consciously identical conduct unfavorable to competition is not illegal if it
involves only independent actions by competitors without any agreement. 64 The complaint alleged parallel conduct in great detail,
explaining how each company sought to inhibit upstarts in its own
region and refrained from entering the other major companies'
regions. 65 But it alleged an agreement mainly in conclusory terms
upon information and belief, because the plaintiffs had no proof yet
in hand.

66

The legal system's concern in this big complex case was obviously
with opening the door to the plaintiffs' expensive discovery. So, the
Supreme Court ordered dismissal on a pre-answer motion for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, holding that the
complaint failed to show its allegation of agreement to be "plausible."'6 7 According to the Court, the defendants' alleged behavior was
merely what each company would have naturally done in pursuit of its
L. REv. 1749, 1759-61, 1774-75 (1998); Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading
Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 444-51 (1986).
60

See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513-15 (2002) (involving a Title

VII employment discrimination claim); Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (involving a civil rights
claim against a municipality).
61 See Michael Chiorazzi et al., Empirical Studies in Civil Procedure:A Selected Annotated Bibliography, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 87, 120 ("[T]here are no
studies on pleading per se, perhaps because of the advent of modern notice pleading."); Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Minutes Oct. 27-28,
2005, at 29-35, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV11-2005-min.

pdf; Civil Rules Advisory Comm.,Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Minutes May 22-23, 2006,
at 37-38, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/CV05-2006-min.pdf.
62 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (elaborating on the meaning of Bell Atlantic).
63 Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 549-51.
64 Id. at 553.
65

Id. at 565.

66
67

Id. at 565 & n.10.
Id. at 570.
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own interests. 68 The plaintiffs needed to give factual detail to make
their complaint plausible, but they "mentioned no specific time,
place, or person involved in the alleged conspiracies." 69 Dismissal followed for these plaintiffs who had "not nudged their claims across the
70
line from conceivable to plausible."
In so ruling, the Court invented a plausibility test for the pleading
stage. This gatekeeping move represents the Court's first unmistakable step backward from the modern conception of notice pleading.
The Court did not step in the direction of simply requiring heightened detail in allegations, but instead it instituted a judicial inquiry
into the pleading's convincingness.
Justice Stevens, joined in relevant part by Justice Ginsburg, dissented. He saw the decision as a "dramatic departure from settled
procedural law," and an unjustified one because it should have come
if at all by amendment to the Federal Rules or by statute. 7 1 He
lamented that by imposing a plausibility test on pleadings
the Court succumbs to the temptation that previous Courts have
steadfastly resisted .... Here, the failure the majority identifies is

not a failure of notice-which "notice pleading" rightly condemns-but rather a failure to satisfy the Court that the agreement
alleged might plausibly have occurred. That being a question not of
notice but of proof [courts will now have] to engage in armchair economics at the pleading stage [in order to ascertain somehow
whether the complaint's pleaded facts adequately show liability] .72
Bell Atlantic, during its short life, has triggered tremendous confusion in case 73 and commentary.74 What exactly it meant is clearly
68 Id. at 566-68.
69 Id. at 565 n.10.
70 Id. at 570.
71 Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 Id.
73 By discombobulating a basic area of law, the case managed to generate an
absolutely extraordinary 5000 case citations in its first eleven months, see Amy J. Wildermuth, What Twombly and Mead Have in Common, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
276, 276 (2008), http://www.law.northwestem.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/12/
LRColi2008nl2Wildermuth.pdf, and 7000 case citations after thirteen months. See
Gregory P. Joseph, FederalLitigation-WhereDid It Go Off Track?, LITIGATION, Summer
2008, at 5, 62. For a judge's consequent lament, see Colleen McMahon, The Law of
Unintended Consequences: Shockwaves in the Lower Courts After Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 41 SUFOLK U. L. REv. 851 (2008). On the implications for state courts, see
Z.W. Julius Chen, Note, Following the Leader:Twombly, PleadingStandards,and Procedural Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431 (2008).
74 Cf Robert G. Bone, Twombly, PleadingRules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REv. 873, 935-36 (2009) (arguing that the Court's thin plausibility standard could be justifiable, if adopted by the proper statute or rule process); Keith
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Bradley, Pleading Standards Should Not Change After Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 102 Nw.
U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 117, 122 (2007), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/
colloquy/2007/31/lrcol12007n3lBradley.pdf ("'Plausibility' is an element of a certain
kind of antitrust conspiracy claim, not a standard for pleadings in general."); Stephen
B. Burbank, Pleadingand the Dilemmas of "GeneralRules, "2009 Wis. L. REv. 535 (arguing that substantive-specific federal common law could modify the transsubstantive
Federal Rules on pleading); Charles B. Campbell, A "Plausible" Showing After Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 9 NEV. L.J. 1, 2 (2008) (translating "plausible" to mean
that a complaint must "'contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all
the material elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory'"
(quoting In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 641 (5th Cir. 1981))); Edward D.
Cavanagh, Twombly, The FederalRules of Civil Procedure and the Courts, 82 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 877, 879 (2008) (concluding that "(1) the Court's assertion that judges cannot
effectively control litigation costs because the parties-not the courts-control claims
and defenses as well as the nature and amount of discovery in any given case is contrary to fact; and (2) certain classes of cases may well warrant particularized pleading
but that decision should be made by the rulemakers through amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and not by judges on an ad hoc basis"); Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF
135, 140, 142 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf (offering that "the best reading of Bell Atlantic is that Rule 8 now requires
notice-plus pleading for all cases," but "it will spawn years of increased litigation");
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'v 61, 99 (2007) (approving the result of
Bell Atlantic, and ultimately supporting "dismissal at the close of pleadings in any case
where the defendant has negated all inferences of culpability by using the same kinds
of public evidence that the plaintiff has used to establish a factual underpinning to
the underlying complaint"); Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable
Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About JudicialPower over Pleadings, 88
B.U. L. REv. 1217, 1255-70 (2008) (criticizing Bell Atlantic from a broader perspective, but ultimately approving a limited screening of conclusory pleadings unless the
pleader can show a special need for discovery); Max Huffman, The Necessity of Pleading
Elements in Private Antitrust Conspiracy Claims, 10 U. PA. J. Bus. & EMP. L. 627, 640-45
(2008) (approving Bell Atlantic's notice-plus pleading as a transsubstantive rule
implicit in Federal Rule 12(b) (6)'s requirement that the pleader show entitlement to
relief); Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleadingand
Summary Judgment Standards, 16 Sup. CT. ECON. REv. 39, 42-54 (2008) (using economic analysis to conclude that pleading standards should vary with the case's evidentiary demands and the social costs of litigation); Allan Ides, Bell Atlantic and the
Principle of Substantive Sufficiency UnderFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2): Toward a
Structured Approach to Federal Pleading Practice, 243 F.R.D. 604, 631-36, 639 (2007)
(approving, with reservations, Bell Atlantic's application of pleading's substantive-sufficiency test to this antitrust case); Randal C. Picker, Twombly, Leegin and the Reshaping
of Antitrust, 2007 Sup. CT. REv. 161, 176-77 (suggesting that the Supreme Court
should have proceeded instead by limiting discovery); J. Douglas Richards, Three Limitations of Twombly: Antitrust Conspiracy Inferences in a Context of HistoricalMonopoly, 82
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 849 (2008) (taking a very narrow view of Bell Atlantic); Douglas G.
Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at
17-24), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1147862 (downplaying and defending
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open to dispute, as is the wisdom of imposing, with no forewarning or
public discussion, any sort of plausibility test on pleading. But of
importance here is the fact that the Court acted with no empirical
support that a problem existed, and with no exploration of the dimensions of that problem or the efficacy of the Court's newfangled cure.
Empirical work on the effects of Bell Atlantic is just getting started.
In the first study, 75 a law student examined the reported cases and
found that the courts are frequently and widely applying the case, in
fields way beyond antitrust. 76 But courts do not seem to be dismissing
cases at a significantly higher rate, except for civil rights cases. In that
Bell Atlantic); A. Benjamin Spencer, PlausibilityPleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 460-89
(2008) (strongly criticizing the new regime of plausibility pleading); Paul J. Stancil,
Balancing the Pleading Equation (Ill. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research
Paper No. LE08-018, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1266323 (calling
for a return to fact pleading, but for only certain classes of cases); Richard M. Steuer,
Plausible Pleading: Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 861, 875
(2008) (saying that Bell Atlantic "increases the burden by replacing the 'no set of facts
test' with a 'show me the facts' test"); Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now
Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1851 (2008) (contending that plausibility testing
violates the Seventh Amendment); Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We
"Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 893, 905-18 (2008) (stressing that
much still remains unclear as to the meaning of Bell Atlantic); Ryan C. Gist, Note,
TransactionalPleading:A ProportionalApproach to Rule Eight in the Wake of Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 2008 Wis. L. REV. 1013, 1035-46 (proposing a rule amendment that would
require plaintiffs to plead a varying degree of factual particularity proportional to the
dangers of both over-restriction and abuse in any given situation); Elizabeth M.
Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate
Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases 7-8 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (lamenting Bell Atlantic's substantive impact). Professor Dodson's
above-cited article is a good place to start, and Professor Spencer's article most helped
me to understand the narrow question of what the decision actually meant. See also
Scott Dodson, Comparative Convergence in PleadingStandards,158 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1351994 (comparing American
pleading to pleading in the rest of the world); A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding
PleadingDoctrine, 108 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 13-18), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1349951 (arguing that pleading today centrally
requires a complaint to describe events about which there is a presumption of
impropriety).
75 Kendall W. Hannon, Note, Much Ado About Twombly ? A Study on the Impact of
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1811
(2008).
76 See id. at 1835-38; cf Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed
Pleading Standardfor Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U. ILL. L. REv. (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract1273713 (finding a small increase in the
rate of dismissal among a small example of Westlaw cases, but the methodology of
searching for the permissive Conley in early cases and the restrictive Twombly in the
later cases would bias the sample in favor of increasing dismissal).
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latter category, he showed that the rate of granting dismissal jumped
77
by eleven points.
2.

Disclosure

As to case exposition through disclosure, "reform" came instead
through rule amendment. Consequently, the adoption of mandatory
disclosure was more comprehensible, but it came equally without an
empirical basis. It proved to be one of the most controversial pretrial
78
reforms of recent times.
The federal rulemakers introduced mandatory disclosure in
1993.79 Parties now must disclose certain core information, elaborating on the pleaded facts without awaiting a discovery request. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), there are three distinct types of
disclosure8 : initial disclosures, expert information, and pretrial disclosures. In particular as to the so-called initial disclosures, the
adopted Rule 26 (a) (1) required disclosure of routine evidentiary and
insurance matters. These matters comprised (1) witnesses "likely to
have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings," (2) documents and things "in the possession, custody, or control of the party that are relevant to disputed
facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings," (3) computation of
claimed damages, and (4) insurance agreements that might cover part
or all of an eventual judgment. 8 1 However, federal districts by local
rule could alter these initial disclosure obligations. Indeed, almost
half the districts opted out of the standard scheme by diminishing
82
initial disclosures to some degree.
The federal rulemakers' introduction of disclosure aimed at
achieving some savings in expense and delay, and also at moderating
77 Hannon, supra note 75, at 1837 (reporting a civil rights dismissal rate of 41.7%
under the pre-Twombly standard and 52.9% under Twombly).
78 See generally Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and ProceduralLaw Reform: A Callfor
a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 845-46 (1993) (noting that there was "little
relevant empirical evidence" when the Advisory Committee adopted the mandatory
disclosure rules); Carl Tobias, CivilJusticeDelay and EmpiricalData: A Response to Professor Heise, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 235, 237-38, 244-46 (2000) (describing the events
leading up to the adoption of the amendments).
79 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (1993) (amended 2000).
80 See id.26(a)(1), (2), (3).
81 Id.26(a)(1).
82 See DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS WITH SPECIFIC ATrENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO

SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26,

at 4 (1998).
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litigants' adversary behavior in the pretrial process. 83 The rulemakers
credited as their inspiration the anecdotal advocacy 8 4 in a law review
article by Professor Wayne Brazil 85 and another by Judge William
Schwarzer. 86 However, critics claimed that disclosure, in its routine
operation and by the inevitably ensuing disputes, would actually
increase expenses and delays; 8 7 also, the critics argued that disclosure
would counterproductively clash with the prevailing adversary system
and with the notice pleading scheme. 88 After the rulemakers' introduction of disclosure, the unabating controversy prompted them
finally to commission empirical studies, by both the Federal Judicial
Center (FJC) 89 and the RAND Institute for Civil Justice (RAND). 90
The FJC reported a survey of 2000 attorneys involved in 1000 general civil cases terminated in 1996 that were likely to have had some
discovery activities, a survey with a 59% response rate. 91 Most of the
responding attorneys felt that initial disclosure had had no effect on
delay or fairness, but among those who detected effects, more attorneys believed the effects to be positive rather than negative. 92 Also,
the respondents rarely reported fears of increased satellite litigation. 93
Finally, by statistical analysis of its small sample of cases, the FJC found
83 FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (1) advisory committee's note on 1993 amendments ("A
major purpose of the revision is to accelerate the exchange of basic information
about the case and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting such
information.").
84 See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the
Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 810 (1991) (observing as to the proposed
disclosure rule that "there is virtually no empirical study of the current practice of
such informal discovery, the efficacy of such experiences, or the results of informal
discovery").
85 Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1348 (1978).
86 William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery
Reform, 50 U. PiTr. L. REV. 703, 721-23 (1989).
87 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 133.
88 See Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., Disclosure Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(a)-"Much Ado About Nothing? "46 HASTINGS L.J. 679, 687 (1995).
89 THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE
PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE (1997); see also Thomas E. Willging
et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 FederalRule
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525 (1998).
90 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT (1998).
91 WILLGING ET AL., supra note 89, at 1.
92

Id. at 5-6.

93

Id. at 6.
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that the use of initial disclosure tended to shorten actual disposition
time. 9 4
The RAND report used its preexisting data to compare a small
group of district courts with local rules requiring some type of disclosure during 1992-1993 to another small group with no such rules. 95
The data included the attorneys' subjective measure of satisfaction
and sense of fairness, as well as objective measures of attorneys' hours
worked and case disposition time. 9 6 RAND found no significant effect
97
of disclosure on fairness sensed, hours worked, or disposition time.
But mandatory disclosure did markedly lower attorney satisfaction.9 8
In 2000, based on these two imperfect studies, the rulemakers
profoundly amended Rule 26(a) (1). Although they now prohibited
the district courts from opting out of the requirements, the
rulemakers exempted eight specified categories of proceedings from
initial disclosure and, most importantly, reduced the scope of the initial disclosure. 99 Henceforth, a party needed to disclose only those
witnesses, as well as those documents and things in the party's custody
or control, "that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or
defenses."' 10 0 However, such disclosures of favorable information no
longer needed to be triggered by "disputed facts alleged with particu'01
larity in the pleadings."'
Professor Kuo-Chang Huang, when still a graduate student at
Cornell Law School, recognized the shortcomings of the two previous
studies and then performed his own clever study of disclosure by using
Administrative Office data.'0 2 Among other statistical analyses, he
"vertically" compared disposition time in the years before a district
court required initial disclosure with disposition time after adoption
of such disclosure. 10 3 He also "horizontally" compared district courts
that required initial disclosure with district courts that had opted out
94

Id.

ET AL., supra note 90, at 4.
96 Id. at 5.
97 Id. at 48-52.
98 Id. at 51-52.
99 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1).
100 Id. 26(a)(1)(A)(i); see also id. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
101 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) (1993) (amended 2000).
102 Kuo-Chang Huang, MandatoryDisclosure:A ControversialDevice with No Effects, 21
PACE L. R~v. 203 (2000); see also Andrew T. Hayashi, The Effects of Mandatory Disclosure (July 13, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1212822 (evaluating the
effect of the Rule 26(a) early disclosure requirement on litigation outcomes by using

95

KAKALI

empirical analysis).
103

Huang, supra note 102, at 242-43.
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of such disclosure. 10 4 By multivariate regression, Professor Huang
showed that adoption of disclosure tended slightly but significantly to
slow down disposition. 10 5 He concluded that with almost no practical
effects, this controversial device has no justification. 10 6 Thus, the
rulemakers in 2000 would have been better advised just to eliminate
10 7
initial disclosure.
3.

Discovery

As to case exposition's external device of discovery, the story is
much the same as for disclosure. Rule amendments over recent
decades have been remarkably frequent, but unremarkably reliant on
logic and anecdote alone.1 0 8 In fact, over the course of its existence,
despite the revolution worked by it, the discovery scheme has seen
very little in the way of systematic empirical study.' 0 9
Nevertheless, this situation may be brightening. Again, Professor
Huang in a recent study" ° shined some light on Taiwan,"' which, at
the least, reflected to the United States. He looked at Taiwan's settle104 Id. at 243-44.
105 Id. at 263.
106 Id.
107 See alsoJeffrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing Odyssey of Discovery "Reform, " LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring/Summer 2001, at
197, 225-28 (noting that mandatory disclosure has not had "much salutary impact"
and calling for further study).
108 For all the rule amendments, with their explanations by advisory committee
notes, see Kevin M. Clermont, History of Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Apr. 2007), http://legal1.cit.cornell.edu/kevin/statsupps/articles/article.htm.
109 SeeJudith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, EmpiricalResearch on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 787 n.11 (1998) (identifying the two major studies as WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968), and PAUL R.
CONNOLLY ET AL.,

FED. JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE

(1978)); cf Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Empirical Study of the
Civil Justice System, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 343, 379-80 (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (flagging also George B. Shepherd, An Empirical
Study of the Economics of PretrialDiscovery, 19 INr'L REV. L. & ECON. 245 (1999)).
110 Kuo-Chang Huang, Does Discovery Promote Settlement? An Empirical Answer, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
995349.
111 For background, see TAIWAN CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Kuo-Chang Huang
trans., Richard Lawton Thurston ed., 2006); CHANG-FA Lo, THE LEGAL CULTURE AND
SYSTEM OF TAIWAN (2006); Hungdah Chiu &Jyh-pin Fa, The Legal System of the Republic
of China in Taiwan, in 2A MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA, at ch. 12 (1989); Liane
Newton & Wang Jong, A Research Guide to Taiwan (ROC) Law, 3 J. CHINESE L. 257
(1989); Tay-sheng Wang, The Legal Development of Taiwan in the 20th Century: Toward a
Liberal and Democratic Country, 11 PAC. RiM L. & PoL'YJ. 531 (2002).
PROCESS
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ment rate before and after its major procedural reform of 2000 that
introduced the concept of discovery.1 1 2 In this first-ever vertical study
of an introduction of discovery, he found that the settlement rate,
which had been steadily decreasing for some reason through 2000,
significantly reversed its direction to increase steadily after 2000.113
After controlling for various variables, he came to think that introducing discovery could be the cause of the new trend and that similar
reform should raise other civil law countries' traditionally low settlement rates-with discovery presumably contributing to settlement by
114
decreasing informational asymmetry as to trial evidence.
4.

Conference

As to case exposition's other external device, pretrial conference,
the story stays the same. Rule amendments over recent decades again
have been frequent, but still reliant on guesswork. Despite some
promising early empirical work, the system's continuing reliance on
conferences has seen virtually nothing in the way of systematic empiri115
cal study.
The lesson here is an obvious one. Not only do practitioners and
students need to attend to empirical methods, but so do commentators on the legal system ranging from academics to journalists. Most
of all, empirical studies must be put before those who govern the system. Indeed, there is a "compelling need for public policymakers to
commission expert, independent evaluations that systematically
gather, analyze, and synthesize dependable empirical data." 116 The
data might come from archival research of some sort, or they might
112 See Huang, supra note 110 (manuscript at 12-14).
113 Id. (manuscript at 19).
114 Id. (manuscript at 33-34).
115 See FIELD ET AL., supra note 20, at 1266-89; Chiorazzi et al., supra note 61, at
137-38.
116 Tobias, supra note 78, at 244; see Thomas E.Willging, Past and Potential Uses of
Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002). But cf
Robert G.Bone, The Empirical Turn in ProceduralRule Making: Comment on Walker, 23J.
LEGAL STUD.595, 597-98, 613 (1994) (stressing the desirability of limits on a proposal
to require such research before rulemaking); Bryant G. Garth, Observations on an
Uncomfortable Relationship: Civil Procedure and Empirical Research, 49 ALA. L. REv. 103,
106-13 (1997) (cataloguing the difficulties of such reform-oriented research); Richard Marcus, Confessions of a Federal "Bureaucrat": The Possibilities of PerfectingProcedural
Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REv. 103, 113-16 (2007) (arguing that empiricists have played
and will play only a small role in rulemaking). See generally Symposium, EmpiricalStudiesof Civil Procedure, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 1 (discussing how
empirical analysis can further the study of civil procedure and including articles
involving original empirical analysis).
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even come from experimental research such as field experiments conducted under the authority of new local rules. 117 Then the policymakers must "closely consult and carefully apply the material assembled
when reforming civil justice."' 18 That is, there is a demand-side problem as well as a supply-side problem with empirical studies: almost
nobody in power pays attention to the few studies that do exist. 19
Official reformers have proceeded largely on the basis of intuition in
overhauling pleading and motion practice, while adding disclosure,
discovery, conference, and settlement mechanisms.
5.

Settlement

On case disposition through settlement, we know neither how
much settlement is optimal, nor how much settlement we are experiencing. Nevertheless, because settlement is so important, and
because the settlement processes extend in time before and after the
pretrial phase, I shall discuss them separately in the next Part.
6.

Motion

As to case disposition through pretrial motions, the device of
20
It
greatest interest in modern times has been summary judgment.
is the important tool for determining whether trial is necessary, a tool
that nicely complements the foregoing pretrial scheme, which fea121
tures notice pleading and extensive discovery.
117

See Tobias, supra note 78, at 242 & n.36, 245 & n.46.

118

Id. at 249.

119 See Michael Heise, The Future of CivilJustice Reform and EmpiricalLegal Scholarship: A Reply, 51 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 251, 251-54 (2000).

120 See Chiorazzi et al., supra note 61, at 128-31 (listing no studies of dispositive
motions, other than summary judgment, as of 1988); cf Hoffman, supra note 74, at
1223 n.28 (citing a few strands of early evidence on motions to dismiss). A more
recent study of motions to dismiss, giving numbers somewhat lower than earlier esti-

mates, found in 1988 that the percentage of federal cases involving one or more Federal Rule 12(b) (6) motions was 13% of the sample; the court decided such a motion
in 10%, and granted it in 6%, of all cases in the sample; and grant of the motion
resulted in termination of 3% of the sample. See THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL
CTR., USE OF

RULE 12(B) (6)

IN

Two

FEDERAL

DISTRICT

COURTS

8-9 (1989); Cf

INST.

FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE Am.LEGAL SYSTEM, CIVIL CASE PROCESSING IN THE FEDCOURTS 47-49 (2009)
(finding that 15% of federal cases in 2005
involved one or more motions to dismiss of any kind, of which 54% were granted in
whole or part). I expect that Bell Atlantic will trigger more studies of motions to dismiss, as defendants begin to use these motions to feel out the plaintiffs' proof and as
courts struggle to divine the new standard of decision. See, e.g.,
sources cited supra
notes 75-76.
ERAL DISTRICT

121

See CLERMONT, supra note 12, at 79-83.
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Summary judgment allows the court to decide legal disputes,
without trial, when there are no genuine and material factual disputes. Under Federal Rule 56, summary judgment will be given to a
movant "entitled to judgment as a matter of law" if "there is no genuine issue" as to any fact that is material to the case (or as to any material application of a legal standard to the facts).122 A "genuine"
factual dispute equates to a triable one, which would require the
motion to be denied and trial awaited. The principal inquiry on the
motion is therefore whether any such factual disputes truly exist,
never how to resolve factual disputes that do exist.
In determining whether there is a genuine issue as to any fact, the
court construes all factual matters in the light reasonably most
favorable to the party opposing the motion and then asks whether
reasonable minds could differ as to the fact's existence. 123 That is,
summary judgment can be granted if, looking only at all the evidence
that is favorable to the opponent of the motion and also the unquestionable evidence that is favorable to the movant, the judge believes
that a reasonable factfinder could not find for the opponent. Under
this standard, disputes on the papers as to objective facts can sometimes be resolved by overwhelming evidence that removes all reasona124
ble doubt, but disputes that turn on credibility cannot.
Accordingly, it is easier to obtain summary judgment against the party
who will bear at least the burden of production at trial, although even
a party who will bear the burden of both production and persuasion at
trial can sometimes properly obtain summary judgment with a sufficiently strong showing.
Despite summary judgment's importance, our knowledge of its
workings has always been scanty. 125 Much uncertainty existed about
122 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). For a recent discussion of a state analogy, see Robert A.
Sedler, The Michigan Supreme Court Diminishes the Right to Trial byjuy in Civil Cases 7-23
(Wayne St. U. L. Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 08-13, 2008), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1 118807.
123 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-52 (1986).
124 See id. at 255 ("Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the
drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of the
judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed
verdict.").
125 See Chiorazzi et al., supra note 61, at 128-31 (listing only two studies of summary judgment as of 1988: an early FJC study reported in JOE S. CECIL & C.R. DOUG_
LAS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE IN THREE DisTRIrc

COURTS

(1987), and the flawed study by William P. McLauchlan, An EmpiricalStudy of the Federal Summary Judgment Rule, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1977), with the latter criticized at
length by Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary Judgment in Federal Civil
Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gommorrah?,1J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 591, 607-11
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how much summary judgment activity was going on. Further details,
some as important as the plaintiffs' and defendants' relative success
rates on such motions, remained even more obscure. This ignorance
provided the backdrop for ongoing academic dispute over the appropriate standard for granting summary judgment.126 Most agreed that
providing for summary judgment is a good idea, especially in today's
strained procedural system, because it allows weeding out those cases
that do not require trial at all. But, of course, the system must avoid
an overuse of summary judgment that would undercut the right to
trial. So, how tough should the standard for summary judgment be?
Some worried academics would have restricted summary judgment by
toughening the prevailing standard12 7-which knocked out cases
when one side was being irrational in disputing the facts-while
128
others would have loosened it in the name of efficiency.
Just three weeks before Bell Atlantic, the Supreme Court stepped
in to encourage use of summary judgment as another way for judges
to short circuit litigation, with the Court taking a very activist role in
drawing inferences from the record in order to reverse a denial of
summary judgment. Scott v. Harris129 was this shot in the dark. Again,
the Court seemed to rely on logic and anecdote, rather than on an
accurate sense of how often parties were making and winning summary judgment motions, to rein in the perceived excesses of today's
litigation.
The case was a civil rights action complaining of the conduct of a
police officer in pursuing an automobile, which he had clocked at
seventy-three mph in a fifty-five mph zone. 3 0 The officer ultimately
bumped the car, causing it to crash and thereby grievously injuring
(2004)); David L. Shapiro, The Story of Celotex: The Role of Summay Judgment in the
Administrationof CivilJustice,in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES, supranote 58, at 359, 381-83
(critiquing more recent studies of summary judgment).
126 Compare Shapiro, supra note 125, at 386 & n.89 (citing authorities "who favor
judicial efficiency in the face of what they see as increasing strains on the system and
who may be willing to give second place to the significance of the 'day-in-court' tradition"), with id. at 386 & n.90 (citing authorities "who see summary judgment as a
potentially costly device, as one that is in a sense 'elitist' because it tends to favor
defendants, and as one that threatens both to divorce results from contextual consideration of all the evidence as presented by live witnesses in open court and to undermine the role of the jury").
127 See id. at 386 n.90.
128 See id. at 386 n.89.
129 550 U.S. 372 (2007); cf. Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App'x 791 (11th Cir. 2008)
(granting summary judgment despite a videotape, which is available at http://www.
youtube.com/watch?vSWC7iSGCk-s).
130 Scott, 550 U.S. at 374.
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the plaintiff driver.1 3 1 The Fourth Amendment required that the
police behavior be objectively reasonable, and so the summary judgment question boiled down to whether the defendant could, as a mat3 2
ter of law, defeat a finding of violation of the Fourth Amendment.1
The Supreme Court, after viewing a videotape of the chase, held that
the plaintiff's conduct posed a risk of imminent harm to others substantial enough to justify the police conduct. 133 That is, the plaintiffs
"version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no rea' 134
sonable jury could have believed him."
Justice Stevens, the sole dissenter, objected to "this unprecedented departure from our well-settled standard. 1 35 He contended
that the videotape "surely does not provide a principled basis for
depriving the [plaintiff] of his right to have a jury evaluate the question whether the police officers' decision to use deadly force to bring
the chase to an end was reasonable."' 36 Indeed, he found the video
ambiguous,13 7 and also pointed out that the majority was purely speculating as to matters such as what would have happened if the police
had simply ceased their pursuit. "In my judgment, jurors in Georgia
should be allowed to evaluate the reasonableness of the decision to
ram respondent's speeding vehicle in a manner that created an obvious risk of death and has in fact made him a quadriplegic at the age of
19."138

By contrast, the Federal Judicial Center has recently released the
premier published study of summary judgment.13 9 It looked at a sam131
132

Id. at 375.
Id. at 381.

133

Id. at 383-84.

134

Id. at 380.

135 Id. at 389 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 390.
137 See id. at 391-92; David Kessler, Justices in the Jury Box: Video Evidence and Summary Judgment in Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007), 31 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 423,
429-30 (2008); see also Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v.
Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV.L. REv. 837, 866 (2009) (showing that about a quarter of tested people who viewed the Scott videotape, which is
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DBY2y2YsmNO, disagreed with the
view that deadly force had been justified); Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell's Vision:
Video and the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1219162 (advocating caution in granting summary judgment based on video evidence in civil rights cases); Howard M. Wasserman,
Video Evidence and Summary Judgment: The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE
180, 182-84 (2008) (challenging more generally the objectivity of video evidence).
138 Scott, 550 U.S. at 397 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal

District Courts, 4J.

EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.

861 (2007); see also INST.

FOR THE ADVANCE-
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ple of federal civil cases (excluding prisoner, Social Security, and benefit repayment cases) in six districts from 1975 to 2000.140 While
emphasizing that summary judgment practice varies considerably with
locale and case type, 14 1 it found overall that the percentage of cases
involving one or more summary judgment motions increased from
12% in fiscal year 1975 to 20% in calendar year 2000;142 the court

granted such a motion in full or in part in 6% or 12%, in those respective years, of all cases in the sample; 143 and grant of summary judgment resulted in termination of 3.7% or 7.8%, respectively, of the
sample. 4 4 It suggested that the modern ascendancy of summary judgment dates from the upswing in the late 1970s ofjudicial case manageSYSTEM, supra note 120, at 49-52 (finding consistently that
17% of federal cases in 2005 involved one or more summary judgment motions, of
which 54% were granted in whole or in part).
140 Cecil et al., supra note 139, at 874-76.
141 See also Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, SummaryJudgment Rates over
Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of Three Large Federal
Districts (Cornell L. Sch. Research Paper, No. 08-022, 2008), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1138373 (reinforcing this point, while pointing out some limitations of
the FJC study). For example, the sizable case category of employment discrimination
(AO code 442) is often empirically distinctive. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J.
Schwab, Employment DiscriminationPlaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARv.
L. & POL'Y REV. 103 (2009) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Update]; Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Farein Federal Court, IJ. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004) [hereinafter Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination];Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'YJ. 547 (2004). A fine study of this particular case category, Vivian Berger et al.,
Summary Judgment Benchmarks for Settling Employment DiscriminationLawsuits, 23 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 45 (2005), looked at a sample of employment discrimination

MENT OF THE AM. LEGAL

cases in two districts during the period around 2000 and found that the court decided
summary judgment motions by defendants in 23% of the cases, with the defendants
experiencing a 64% success rate on those motions (with a much higher rate against
pro se plaintiffs). Id. at 53-57. Thus, summary judgment is a common means of

disposing of this category of cases. See Laura Beth Nielsen et al., UncertainJustice:
Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contemporary United States 16-18
(Am. Bar Ass'n Found. Research Paper Series, No. 08-04, 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1093313; Schneider, supra note 74, at 16-17. Moreover, a sampling of online judicial opinions on defendants' summary judgment motions in Title
VII employment discrimination cases showed a statistically significant effect of the
political party of the President who had appointed the trial judge. John Friedl &
Andre Honoree, Is Justice Blind? Examining the Relationship Between PresidentialAppointments ofJudges and Outcomes in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 CUMB. L. REv. 89
(2007).
142 Cecil et al., supra note 139, at 882.
143 Id. at 883.
144 Id.
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ment and its emphasis on motion practice.1 45 Incidentally, among all
the summary judgment motions over the whole time period studied,
viewed on a motion level rather than a case level, 72% were motions
by defendants (with a 49% rate of granting in full or in part in 2000),
while 28% were plaintiffs' motions (with a 36% success rate in
2000) .146
To conclude this discussion of pretrial practice on a happier
note, the federal rulemakers are now readying to amend Rule 56, with
a projected effective date of December 1, 2010.147

They would

include new procedures requiring parties to state the facts assertedly
uncontested and to respond thereto; the rule also would clarify judicial options when a party fails to respond to a motion and would recognize the practice of moving for partial summary judgment.I 48 The
encouraging development here is not the detailed proposal, which
very well may be undesirable, but the fact that the rulemakers are
heavily relying on the Federal Judicial Center to get empirical support
149
in advance of amending the rule.
145 Common knowledge was that the granting of summary judgment became rampant only after the Supreme Court had explicated and blessed the summary judgment
device in a trilogy of cases in 1986: Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); and Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). See Shapiro, supra note 125, at 379-81 (citing
sources expressing that view). The FJC study proves this common knowledge wrong,
in that the increase in granting summary judgment predates the trilogy. See Cecil et
al., supra note 139, at 902. On the possible link between the long-term increase in
summary judgment and the long-term decline in civil trial, see infra note 186.
146 Cecil et al., supra note 139, at 886-89.
147 The proposal, published for public comment in August 2008, appears at
Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee 21-56, availableat http://www.uscourts.
gov/rules/Reports/CVReport.pdf; see Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conf. of
the U.S., Minutes Nov. 8-9, 2007, at 19-30, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/CV1-2007-min.pdf; Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference
of the U.S., Minutes Apr. 19-20, 2007, at 3-22, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/CV04-2007-min.pdf; Civil Rules Advisory Comm., Judicial Conference
of the U.S., Minutes Sept. 7-8, 2006, at 24-30, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/CV09-2006-min.pdf; see also Adam N. Steinman, An Ounce of Prevention:
Solving Some Unforeseen Problems with the Proposed Amendments to Rule 56 and the Federal
Summary Judgment Process, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 230, 230-32 (2008), http://
www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/45/LRCol12008n45Steinman.
pdf (discussing the rationale behind the Committee's proposal).
148 See Report of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, supra note 147, at 21-26.
149 See, e.g., Memorandum from Joe Cecil & George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to
Judge Michael Baylson (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://www.jc.gov/public/pdf.
nsf/lookup/insumjre.pdf/$file/insumjre.pdf (reporting that local rules requiring
statements of uncontested fact seem to have little impact).
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Time to Termination

As the number of pretrial steps might suggest, the pretrial phase
is the lengthiest phase of litigation. Naturally, then, it has been the
focus of recent reform efforts to speed up litigation.
It is not surprising that reformers focus on delay in litigation,
whether in the pretrial phase or in the other phases of a lawsuit.
"Delay in the courts is unqualifiedly bad."'150 Justice delayed is justice
denied, after all. And there is plenty of judicial delay for everyone.
But caution!
Although Figure 2 might show delay, it does not support a view
that the problem has increased recently, even though here I have
extended it to cover the most recent years. The upper dashed line
shows the slightly increasing average time from filing to termination
for all federal civil cases in which the procedural progress code indicates resolution during or after trial. More importantly, the lower
solid line shows the time to termination for the much more numerous
cases resolved before trial begins (over the thirty-seven-year period,
the increasing percentage that are pretrial terminations has averaged
ninety-six percent). These untried cases do not take that long, and
the length has not increased over the years despite the considerable
increase in the courts' caseloads shown by the dotted line.
Moreover, there are other good reasons to proceed with wariness
before accepting the truth of either old maxims about delay or the
potential of new reforms based merely on intuition. Both recent theoretical work and recent empirical study argue for such caution.
15
Theoretical work contends that delay is not necessarily an evil. '
Delay is an unavoidable feature of life, and it is not an evil in itself.
The only evil is excessive delay, where excessive means that the costs
of delay outweigh its benefits. The costs of figuratively queuing to try
a case tend to be exaggerated, because we overlook that the parties
can engage in other pursuits while waiting. Meanwhile, queuing in
fact has some benefits, such as lowering the demand for expensive
trials.

150

14ANS ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT, at xxii (2d ed. 1978); see also INST. FOR

THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note

120,

at

1

(continuing the

search for procedures to defeat the serious problem of delay); THE LAW's DELAY (C.H.
van Rhee ed., 2004) (featuring comparative and historical studies lamenting delay).
151 See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw § 21.14 (7th ed. 2007);
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal ProcedureandJudicialAdministration, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 445-48 (1973).
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Another study,1 52 both theoretical and empirical, shows that
many obvious reforms simply have not worked and will not work to
reduce delay.' 53 The basic insight is that any reduction in delay
increases the incentives to litigate and reduces the parties' incentives
to settle, with the consequent increase in caseload offsetting the
reduction in delay. Therefore, most attempts at reform, such as heeding the constant call for adding judges, will only increase the number
of dispositions, rather than decreasing the time to disposition.
Adding judges to the system to reduce congestion is similar to
expanding the number of lanes on a freeway, an improvement that
would draw traffic off the side streets and from public transportation.
More cases might flow into the system, and the lesser burden of litigating might reduce the subsequent incentives to settle rather than litigate, so the increased number of judges would be able to adjudicate
basically the same percentage of cases. Indeed, the author of the
152

George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L.

REv. 527 (1989).

153 Id. at 557; see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation,98 Nw.
U. L. REv. 545, 563 (2004) (arguing that the increased availability of court resources
may fail to reduce congestion because of the corresponding increase in litigation
demand); John Leubsdorf, The Myth of Civil ProcedureReform, in CRIIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS
53 (Adrian A.S. Zuckerman ed., 1999) (questioning more generally the efficacy of
procedural reform).
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study postulated a "congestion equilibrium hypothesis": almost all
reform attempts to accelerate litigation will be largely offset by
54
increases in the amount of litigation.
Pure empirical work in this area is rather rare because of the scarcity of data and the inherently complex nature of the relevant
research questions. It is unclear even what to measure, no less how to
measure in a controlled way. But the empirical work that exists, while
suggesting that delay is neither that lengthy nor increasing recently, is
otherwise consistently discouraging for the persistent reformer. One
study used state data to demonstrate that particular processes, such as
alternative dispute resolution (ADR), do not correlate with shortened
disposition times-meanwhile, the factors that do so correlate, such as
forum locale and case category, are beyond the reach of process-ori55
ented reform.1
In sum, assumptions about delay are risky, making empirical
study a necessity. But the caution of conducting empirical studies warrants yet more caution. Some related empirical work that Professor
Eisenberg and I have done counsels this doubled caution.
Once again using the Administrative Office database of federal
civil cases, but now limited to sizable tort and contract categories that
clearly involved a choice between jury and judge trial, we showed that
while the actual jury trials themselves may proceed twice as slowly as
bench trials conducted by a judge without a jury, over their lives on
the docket such judge-tried cases last significantly longer than jurytried cases: the median judge-tried case spends 619 days on the district
court docket, compared to the median jury-tried case terminating in
566 days. 15 6 That is, although most commentators assume that the
wait in the jury queue is uniformly longer than the wait for a judge's
trial and decision, 1 5 7 the reality in federal courts is the opposite. After
regression and other analyses, we found the most likely explanation to
154 Priest, supra note 152, at 535-39.
155 Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition
Time, 50 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 813, 848 (2000); see also Priest, supra note 152, at 535,
537 (forwarding the "congestion equilibrium hypothesis" while suggesting "that there
is likely to be some equilibrium level of delay within any jurisdiction," but recognizing
that procedure can be made more or less just at any given equilibrium level of delay
and also acknowledging that certain reforms such as increasing court costs or altering
the local legal culture could lower the equilibrium somewhat).
156 Theodore Eisenberg & Kevin M. Clermont, Trial by Jury orJudge: Which Is Speedier?, 79 JUDICATuRE 176, 176-78 (1996) (observing that means tell the same story as
medians).
157 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 151, § 21.15, at 628 ("Court queues are longest for
parties seeking civil jury trials."); Leon Sarpy, Civil Juries, Their Decline and Eventual
Fal 11 Loy. L. REV. 243, 255-56 (1963) (similar implication); see also GORDON
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be that the press of other duties leads judges to interrupt bench trials,
to postpone issuing their eventual decision, and thereby to slow down
judge-tried cases. 158 Consequently, a reform aimed at restricting jury
1 59
trials in order to reduce delay is apt to be counterproductive.
Here the new development since the original Litigation Realities
was learning that current data on tort and contract cases from state
courts of general jurisdiction suggest that jury cases do in fact last significantly longer than bench cases: the median disposition time in the
state courts for ajury-tried case was 21.7 months and for ajudge-tried
case only 16.1 months. 160 For that result, the researchers looked at
one year's trials in the nation's seventy-five largest counties. 161
Although, of course, some unperceived selection effect could be at
play, any difference between the data sets that would explain this federal/state difference is not readily apparent. For example, the data
sets comprised completed trials in comparable case categories occurring in comparable proportions, and the federal/state difference was
16 2
quite consistent across those case categories.
43-45 (1981) (giving
survey results).
158 Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 156, at 199.
159 See Heise, supra note 155, at 815-16.
160 See Thomas H. Cohen & Steven K. Smith, Civil Trial Cases and Verdicts in Large
Counties, 2001, BULLETIN (Bureau ofJust. Stat., Wash. D.C.), Apr. 2004, at 1, 3, 8 (noting that the sample also included a small number of real property cases); see also
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical
Portrait,19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 433, 449 (1996) (explaining that these state data on
juries and judges contrast the median time from filing to verdict with the median time
from filing to judgment, respectively). The pattern persisted in a more recent study.
See Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench andJury Trials in State Courts, 2005,
SPEC. REP. (Bureau ofJust. Stat., Wash. D.C.), Oct. 2008, at 1, 8. A separate but significant point is that in terms of time on the docket, state jury cases take longer than
federal jury cases. See Thomas H. Cohen, General CivilJuy Trial Litigation in State and
Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait,5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 593, 606-08 (2008).
161 Cohen & Smith, supra note 160, at 1.
162 The studies' difference in time periods is not the explanation either. Our
study found that judge-tried cases took longer than jury-tried cases every year from
fiscal year 1947 through fiscal year 1994, while it performed its specific computations
and analyses on fiscal years 1979-1994. See Eisenberg & Clermont, supra note 156, at
178-79. The state data include 11,675 cases (76%jury-tried) from only calendar year
2001. Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 2001, http://
www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/03957.xml. Accordingly, I did a new
study of the federal data for fiscal years 1995-2006, a period bracketing the state year
and including 16,709 cases (73% percent jury-tried). I dropped 276 extraordinarily
delayed jury-tried personal injury cases all terminated in the District of Puerto Rico on
December 4, 2000. The federal situation has not changed since our earlier study:
judge-tried cases still take longer than jury-tried cases every year, with the median
BERMANT ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PROTRACTED CIVIL TRIALs
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The resulting contrast between federal and state courts demonstrates that before drawing conclusions, one must either ensure that
most pieces of the empirical puzzle are visible or restrain one's conclusions accordingly. An examination of the underlying state
database confirms that state jury trials start much later in a case's life
2 63
than state bench trials do, which is not the case in federal courts
Another important observation is that state judges do not delay nearly
as long after the end of bench trial before issuing a decision as do
federal judges. 164 It therefore seems that the state courts, unlike the
federal courts, are imposing waiting costs upon those who wish a jury
trial and not on those who agree to a bench trial, with the effect of
discouraging jury trials. 165 Not all states follow this practice, as some
adopt a more neutral approach or the federal approach.1 66 Nonetheless, although ultimately a matter of local culture, most states act,

judge-tried case now spending 641 days on the district court docket, compared to the
median jury-tried case terminating in 581 days.
163 The state data, see Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, supranote 162, indicate on average that state jury trials start almost six months after state bench trials, while our study
suggested that federal judges do not delayjury trials by much if at all. See Eisenberg &
Clermont, supra note 156, at 180 & n.21.
164 The state data, see Nat'l Ctr. for State Courts, supra note 162, indicate on average that state judges delay only about twenty-three days after the trial ends, while our
study suggested that federal judges delay more than three months. See Eisenberg &
Clermont, supra note 156, at 180, 199.
165 See POSNER, supra note 151, § 21.15, at 628 ("Jury trials are more costly than
bench trials ....Parties are therefore 'charged' more for jury trials by being made to
wait in line longer."); Posner, supra note 151, at 447 (recommending "a substantial
fee" to discourage demands for jury trial). Policies to discourage jury trial are not
unthinkable, as courts have long discouraged criminal jury trials by imposing harsher
sentences on those defendants who pursued ajury trial rather than a bench trial. See
Thomas M. Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, "He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of
His". An Analysis ofJudicial Sentencing Patterns injury Cases, 14 LAW & Soc'v REV. 323
(1980).
166 Taking the state data for 2001 and the federal data for 1995-2006, see supra
note 162, I computed, for each state county and for each federal district, the difference between the median days for ajury-tried case and the median days for a judgetried case. The standard deviation is about 158 for those county figures and about
114 for those district figures, meaning that states show more variability in their relative speeds of handling trials than do the federal courts. Some of the federal variability may indeed stem from the effect of the local state attitude; the federal and state
data do show some correlation, so that as the county's tendency to delay jury trials
increases, the local federal district's tendency to speed jury trials decreases. See also
infra note 191 (noting that the number of state jury trials has fallen more precipitously than state judge trials perhaps due to state procedures that discourage jury

trials).
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whether intended or not, in ways that tend to discourage jury trialswhile federal courts do not.
III.
A.

SETTLEMENT

Importance of Settlement

Most lawsuits do not make it all the way through the pretrial practice I have just examined. Indeed, most disputes do not even become
overlawsuits in the first place. Injured persons abandon or settle the
1 67
whelming majority of grievances at some point along the line.
A useful mental image is the so-called grievance pyramid, which
from its broad bottom of the whole realm of human experience narrows upward to injurious experiences, grievances, claims, and then to
disputes, a set that in turn produces the subset of litigated cases.1 68 As
one progresses up the steps of the pyramid, most cases peel off
through avoidance, nonperception, acceptance, settlement, or some
other alternative to litigation. For example, only a subset of grievances ripen into claims when the aggrieved voices the grievance to the
injurer-most aggrieved persons accept their injury, viewing it as part
of life or just figuring that no remedy is available. Similarly, most disputants never make it to a lawyer, much less to a courthouse. Thus,
infinite experiences produce countless disputes, which yield few cases.
From the viewpoint of the civil justice system, settlement fills a
critical need. Ours is a slow and expensive procedure. The system
simply would not be able to adjudicate all cases conceivable or even all
those filed. We depend on the parties finding alternatives to using
the system. Accordingly, reformers are constantly seeking ways to
increase the settlement rate (which is a loose term that here measures
the percentage of filed cases leaving the sides of the grievance pyramid, whether by abandonment, concession, or privately negotiated
settlement or by ADR such as arbitration, mediation, and conciliation). Many reformers contend that the settlement rate in the United
1
States today lies below the optimum.

69

167 See generally FIELD ET Am., supranote 20, at 125-36 (giving background on settlement process); William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming Blaming, Claiming.... 15 LAw & Soc'y REv. 631, 636 (1981) ("[O]nly a
small fraction of injurious experiences ever mature into disputes."); Marc Galanter,
Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know)
About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 11-36 (1983)
(exploring "current American disputing patterns").
168 See Galanter, supra note 167, at 11-36.
169 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophicaland
DemocraticDefense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2671-91 (1995) (argu-
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Nevertheless, the system must adjudicate some cases in order to
pronounce the law. These cases set the standards under which the
parties negotiate settlement of their disputes. The parties can thereby
"bargain in the shadow of the law" to reach outcomes that generally
conform to the law and thereby further the law's purposes. 70 Thus,
the settlement rate could conceivably become too high. If parties settled all cases, there would be big gaps in the law that is supposed to be
setting the standards for settlement. 17 1 If courts adjudicated some
cases, but still too few, the gaps might be smaller but the law would
remain not only inefficiently fuzzy but also insufficiently conformed to
social purposes. But at some lower settlement rate, the law would be
172
optimally set so that further adjudication would be wasteful.
Shifting from the viewpoint of the system to that of the disputants, settlement is also of critical importance. For them, in the usual
course, settlement is our system ofjustice (and for their "trial" lawyers,
negotiation of settlements-and pursuit of other alternatives to litigaing that settlements are not inherently inferior to adjudicated outcomes). In reality,
however, reformers would not find it easy to raise, or for that matter lower, the settle-

ment rate. See supra text accompanying note 153.
170 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 997 (1979).
171 See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 366, 388 (1986).
172 See id. at 372, 388 (suggesting that there is an optimal settlement rate); see also
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984) (discussing the problem of
relying too heavily on settlement).
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tion-is what their profession primarily entails). Alternatives to litigation usually offer procedural and substantive advantages to the
disputants. 173 Again, however, some optimal settlement rate exists,
above which the increases in external pressure to settle would impose
174
undesirable costs on party autonomy.
B.

Rate of Settlement

Despite its undeniable importance, we do not know much about
the actualities of settlement. 175 It is hard to observe. Litigation, with
its judgments, is much more observable than settlement. Empirical
studies tend to focus on the readily observable.
It is obvious, nevertheless, that the settlement rate is high. Alternatively put, the slope of the sides of the grievance pyramid is quite
gentle, so that a huge percentage of situations leave the pyramid at
each step upward. A telephone survey in January 1980 of more than
five thousand households indicated that during the previous three
years just over a third of the households had perceived one or more
grievances of certain litigable types; 71.8% of those grievances produced a claim informally; 62.6% of those claims met an initial rebuff
to produce a dispute; and 11.2% of those disputes resulted in filing a
lawsuit. 1 76 Indeed, these percentages are exaggeratedly high, because
the survey limited its inquiries to grievances involving $1000 or more.
But even for such substantial grievances, litigation is by no means a
kneejerk or common reaction in the United States, as overall only 5%
1 77
of the survey's grievances ultimately resulted in a court filing.
Do we have a better idea of the settlement rate for filed cases?
Everyone knows that in this world of litigation at the top of the pyra173 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: CivilJury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1, 1-4 (1996).
174 See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": JudicialPromotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STN. L. REv. 1339, 1354-59, 1387-88 (1994); Stephen McG.
Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 73-78

(1992).
175 See Chiorazzi et al., supra note 61, at 131-37.
176 Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims, and Disputes: Assessing the
Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 525,534-37 (1981); see also David M. Trubek et
al., The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 86-87 (1983). For a compari-

son to numbers from abroad, see Masayuki Murayama, Japanese Disputing Behavior
Reconsidered 7-9 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.

iias.sinica.edu.tw/resource/970621 /970621l10.pdf (suggesting that percentages in
other countries-Japan and England-are similar at early steps of the dispute pyramid, before persons get involved in the legal system itself).
177 See Miller & Sarat, supra note 176, at 544 (showing 50 total court filings out of
1000 total grievances).
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mid, the sides' slope remains gentle. Of the relatively few filed cases,
only a small percentage make it through the procedural system to a
contested judgment. Seeking greater specificity, the original Litigation
Realities divided all federal civil cases among four sets of disposition
methods (settlement, pretrial adjudication, trial adjudication, and
other).178 Since then, however, another researcher, in a difficult article, made the important point that the Administrative Office codes
relevant to settlement are ambiguous and hence treacherous, and
even more so in regard to data drawn from different years.1 79 While
her research counsels against making fine distinctions or drawing
strong conclusions from the Administrative Office data as to settlement, it also demands my reallocating the codes to refine the four sets
of disposition methods. 180 After reallocating, I can take as an illustra178 We showed the fate of cases over the years from 1979 to 2000. The coding of
disposition method became consistent enough to use only in fiscal year 1979, and
data were then available only through fiscal year 2000.
179 Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Tfials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial Adjudications, and StatisticalArtifacts in the ChangingDisposition of Federal Civil Cases, I J. EMPIRCAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 723-28 & tbls.4, 5, 6 (2004) (faulting especially AO codes 6, 14,
and 17, although their errors are offsetting). Her conclusions included that the AO
data, without impractical unscrambling that involves at least auditing the cases' files,
tended to overstate the decline of the civil trial, although this decline certainly
existed. Id. at 728-33. Furthermore, she saw an increase (over time) in pretrial disposition as offsetting that decline in civil trials and a slight decline in settlement,
although this conclusion rested heavily on a comparison of recent data to incommensurable data from 1970. Id.
Finally, she argued that the AO classifies many nonfinal dispositions as settlements, so that she found only a 51.4% settlement rate-3.5% abandonment, 5.4%
default judgment, 2.0% consent judgment, and 40.5% "settled"-in a few hundred
cases sampled from fiscal year 2000. See id. at 730 tbl.7 (omitting prisoner cases and
government recovery of overpayments and student loans). The AO data, analyzed by
my method without her unscrambling, would show a 66.2% settlement rate, not
51.4%, for the same sort of cases from the same fiscal year. However, her 32.1% rate
for nonfinal dispositions derived in part from her broad definition of nonfinal disposition, including not only transfer and the like, but also voluntary dismissal recorded
without any indicator of settlement and even dismissal pending consummation of settlement. Many of these so-called nonfinal dispositions, then, are actually agreed settlements or are effectively settlements; most of the remaining dispositions are in the
nature of temporary dismissals that will result in eventual settlement, if not immediate
abandonment, because settlement is how most cases end anyway. Therefore, her settlement rate is understated. An alternative, but still crude, comparison of our results
would be to change the denominators, by omitting her nonfinal dispositions and my
so-called other dispositions, the latter being 13.3%. Then, her settlement rate and
mine are both 76%.
180 I have refined the division of AO codes along the following lines. First, tried
cases are now those with a method-of-disposition value of 7 to 9. Second, cases adjudicated without trial are those with a method-of-disposition value of 6, 15, 17, 19, or 20.
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tion all the 271,753 federal civil cases terminated in all federal districts
during fiscal year 2005.181 Of these, approximately 67.7% were coded
as settled in one way or another; around 20.7% were adjudicated at
the pretrial phase, as by a motion under Federal Rule 12 or 56; about
1.3% were adjudicated at the trial phase; and the other 10.3% of the
cases fell 182 into a welter of other classification codes, predominantly

remand or transfer to another court, whereby most would result as a
Third, settled cases are those with a method-of-disposition value of 2 (lack of prosecution), 4 (default judgment), 5 (consent judgment), 12 to 14 (dismissals: voluntary,
settled, or other), or 18 (statistical closing). Code 3 switched in usage around 1991
from voluntary dismissal to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, so I grouped its earlier
usage with settlement, but its usage in 1991 and later with nontrial adjudication.
Fourth, other dispositions are all remaining method-of-disposition values, predominantly remand or transfer to another court. See Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination, supra note 141, at 440 n.14.
The definition of settlement rate is critical. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte
Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
111, 112-15 (2009). The different settlement rates that others sometimes invoke, e.g.,
Hadfield, supranote 179, at 730, usually stem from different definitions. My interest
here is in the grievance pyramid, and hence in the difference between cases that the
system has to adjudicate and those that exit the sides of the pyramid. To make this
distinction from contested judgments, I am defining settlement rate in the district
courts to include the plaintiff's abandonment or the defendant's concession, as well
as compromise by private negotiations or through ADR. I could alter my definition in
various ways. First, if I were interested in disposition without any judicial input, I
could add the requirement that the procedural progress code shows no court action,
which would drop the 67.7% settlement rate for fiscal year 2005 all the way to 17.5%.
Second, if I were more interested in compromise by the parties, I could instead excise
method-of-disposition codes 2 (lack of prosecution) and 4 (default judgment) from
the realm of settlement, which would drop that 67.7% settlement rate to 61.5%.
Third, if I were interested only in dispositions of a more final sort, I could omit my socalled other dispositions from the denominator, which would raise that 67.7% rate to
75.5%. Fourth, no matter what my interest, I could try to get inside the dismissals
coded 12, 13, 14, or 18 to determine which entries represented compromise and
which represented adjudication; but in deference to the limits of time, I take comfort
in Professor Hadfield's findings that the adjudicated dismissals in those particular
codes are offset by the settlements erroneously included within the codes for adjudicated dispositions. See id. at 723-28.
181 See LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 2005, at 155 tbl.C-1 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/cl.pdf. Settlement practice varies
considerably with locale and case type, as well as over time. See Stewart J. Schwab &
Theodore Eisenberg, Explaining ConstitutionalTort Litigation: The Influence of the Attorney Fees Statute and the Government as Defendant, 73 CORNELL L. Rtv. 719, 733 (1988).
On the determinants of settlement more generally, see Kessler & Rubinfeld, supra
note 109, at 381-83.
182 For these percentages, I am categorizing the AO data that underlie the table
cited supra note 181 by using the codes specified supra note 180.
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matter of probability in an eventual settlement rather than a final
adjudication.
I can then combine all these rough numbers with the visual presentation of the grievance pyramid. From the experiential infinitude,
imagine that 1000 sizable grievances arise. This typical thousand will
decrease to 718 claims, 449 disputes, 50 filed cases, 12 litigated judgments and 1 decided appeal.18 3 Thus, I advisedly described the pyramid's sides by saying that their slope is gentle.
I can now also redraw and extend Figure 3 beyond what appeared
in the original Litigation Realities. The coding reallocation raises the
rate of pretrial adjudication while lowering the rate of "other" dispositions, compared to the original version of the graph. But the percentage of these other dispositions still increases with time. Because most
of these other dispositions will result eventually in agreed settlement,
if not immediate abandonment, the overall rate of settlement is holding about constant. Thus, Figure 3 continues to tell the same basic
story of the continuing dominance of settlement, against the backdrop of a growing role for pretrial adjudication and a diminishing
role for civil trial.
IV.
A.

TRILu

Decline of Civil Trial

As nontrial terminations of various sorts have increased, the civil
185
trial has all but disappeared. 8 4 Many have noted this trend of late,
183 For the percentage of litigated judgments, I used 20.7% + 1.3% + .22(10.3%) =
24.3%. The comparable percentage for 1980, at the time of the telephone survey, was
23.8%. For the percentage on appeal, see infra note 242 and accompanying text.
184 The trend of the vanishing civil trial is apparent from the hard copy of the
Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts. Over the years its Table C-4, prepared with the procedural progress codes for
cases terminated during or after trial, shows a steady decrease from almost 12% of
civil terminations having reached trial in the 1960s to the current levels approaching
1%. During that period, the growing number of federal judges managed to increase
the absolute number of civil trials as the caseload grew, until reaching a peak of
12,570 trials in fiscal year 1985 according to the AO's measure. See Shari Seidman
Diamond & Jessica Bina, Puzzles About Supply-Side Explanationsfor Vanishing Trials: A
New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 639-45, 649 (2004)
(emphasizing the inadequacy of increase in number of federal judges, as well as showing the increase in weighted filings per judge over time). But civil trials per year have
since dropped, so that in fiscal year 2006 there were many fewer civil trials (3555)
than in fiscal year 1961 (5553 trials). The AO reports an uptick for fiscal year 2007.
185 See Ad Hoc Comm. on the Future of the Civil Trial, Am. College of Trial Lawyers, The "Vanishing Trial". The College, the Profession, the Civil Justice System, 226 F.R.D.
414, 414 (2005) ("'For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple,
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although there is less agreement on cause.' 8 6 The phenomenon does
not appear to be limited to civil cases, 18 7 or to federal courts,18 8 or to
18 9
the United States for that matter.
and wrong."' (quoting H.L. Mencken)); Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 1, at
142-44; Symposium, The Vanishing Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Symposium, Vanishing Trial, 2006J. DisP. RESOL. 1.
186 See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal
Courts, 543 ANNALS

AM.

AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 39, 46-48 (1996) (emphasizing growth

of the competing criminal trial docket); Lisa Blomgren Bingham, When We Hold No
Truths to Be Self-Evident: Truth, Belief Trust, and the Decline in Trials, 2006J. DisP. RESOL.
131, 154 (emphasizing loss of public belief in truth); DennisJ. Drasco, PublicAccess to
Information in Civil Litigation vs. Litigant'sDemandfor Privacy:Is the "Vanishing Trial" an
Avoidable Consequence?, 2006J. DisP. RESOL. 155, 155-57 (emphasizing litigants' desire
for confidentiality); Gross & Syverud, supra note 173, at 1-3 (emphasizing systemic
pressure to settle); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial
Lecture, Loyola University School of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L.
REv. 1405, 1420 (2002) (emphasizing increased litigation costs); Patrick E. Longan,
The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials, 35 ARiz. L. REv. 663,
669-72, 677-78 (1993) (emphasizing, in part, the growth in number and complexity
of civil cases); Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline, 53 U. CHI.
L. REv. 494, 526-39 (1986) (emphasizing judicial and cultural assumptions); Hope
Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2002, at 24, 26-27 (emphasizing
the push toward ADR); Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern
Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REv. 631, 632-39 (emphasizing the increase in judges' pretrial tasks).
One particularly suggestive study links, albeit tentatively and partially, the decline
in the civil trial to the increase in summary judgment grants. See Burbank supranote
125, at 617-18; see also supra text accompanying notes 139-147 (discussing trends in
summary judgment rates). A number of other articles intuited the same link. See,
e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The PretrialRush toJudgment: Are the "LitigationExplosion," "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court andJury Trial Commitments?, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1048-57 (2003) (observing the increased use of summary judgment following the Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy); Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REv. 1329,
1333 (2005) ("Whatever influence these factors have actually had in the reduction in
the number of trials, however, it is not unreasonable to suspect that one of the primary contributors to this result, at least at the federal level, has been the Supreme
Court's substantial modification and expansion of the modem doctrine of summary
judgment."); Milton I. Shadur, Trials or Tribulations (Rule 56 Style)?, LITIGATION, Winter 2003, at 5, 5 (noting that the Supreme Court's 1986 trilogy "has worked a systemic
sea change" in the granting of summary judgment motions).
187 See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 492-500 (2004).
188

See Ostrom et al., supra note 21, at 770-72.

189

See Herbert M. Kritzer, DisappearingTrials?A ComparativePerspective, 1J. EMPIRI-

cAL LEGAL STUD. 735, 752-54 (2004) (examining trial patterns in England, Wales, and

the Canadian province of Ontario, and finding a reasonably clear pattern of declining
rates of civil trials). But cf. Carolien Klein Haarhuis & Bert Niemeijer, Vanishing or
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Interestingly, judge trial fell even more precipitously than jury
trial in federal civil cases. This development is especially mysterious
because both queues for trial pass through the regulation of the same
person, the trial judge.1 90 Perhaps the explanation lies in judicial distaste for a consuming task like bench trial; or, as the disincentives to
any trial have increased, those litigants who prefer jury trial have
proved to be the more determined group. But a major contributing
factor is that, as already explained,19 1 the federal courts do nothing to
discourage jury trial as they neither make litigants wait longer nor
impose any special user fee for this costly form of trial, but rather
Increasing Trials in the Netherlands?, 2006J. Disp. RESOL. 71, 76-97 (showing that various Dutch social pressures have increased the civil "trial" rate).
190 The explanation does not reside in a single case category, such as employment
discrimination where the jury right has expanded in the recent past. See Clermont &
Schwab, Employment Discrimination,supra note 141, at 432-38 (showing that the shift
to jury trials for employment discrimination cases has offset the sharp decline in
bench trials). The mass of cases, even with the employment discrimination cases
omitted, would show virtually the same drop in absolute and relative use ofjudge trial.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 156-166. State courts, which generally act
in ways that relatively discourage jury trials, have exhibited the opposite pattern: jury
trials have fallen more precipitously than a broadly defined set of judge trials. See
Ostrom et al., supra note 21, at 770, 777.
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discourage judge trial by protracting it. Parties, either of which can
opt for jury trial, act upon those economic incentives.
Extended through 2006, Figure 4 presents some suggestive data
on these time trends. 192 The solid and dashed lines show jury and
judge trials, respectively, as a percentage of all federal civil terminations. These percentages have decreased with the passing years, and
the judge line fell more sharply than the jury line until 2000. The
dotted line shows the result in the form of an increasing ratio of jury
trials to judge trials. For example, in 1979 there was one jury trial for
every two judge trials, and by 2006 there were more than two jury trials
for every judge trial. A lot more analysis remains necessary to get a
secure take on the causes, or even on the real size of the declines
given a changing legal environment. 193 And then there would remain
the contentious issue of the normative implications of the vanishing
194
civil trial and bench trial.
Nevertheless, some stories are becoming apparent. Figures 2, 3,
and 4, taken together, describe an adjudicatory system in equilibrium.
In the mid-1970s a butterfly beat its wings in Brazil or, more directly,
the population of the United States grew, and so court filings started
going up. The lawmakers increased the system's capacity, but not
19 5
enough, partly because having more judges induced more filings.
The judiciary reacted with increased attention to judicial management
and a new emphasis on motion practice, so that the granting of sum192 Here I used the procedural progress codes of 7 and 9-termination during
and after jury trial-to define jury trial usage. However, I used the disposition
method code of 9-judgment on court trial-to define judge trial usage. The reason
for abandoning the procedural progress code for judge trials was that the AO unfortunately defines "trial" for procedural progress purposes to include all contested proceedings in which evidence is introduced, thus distortingly including a good number
of motion hearings as judge trials. See Higginbotham, supra note 186, at 1405-06.
However, the disposition method code did not become consistent until fiscal year
1979.
193 See Stephen B. Burbank, Keeping Our Ambition Under Control: The Limits of Data
and Inference in Searchingfor the Causes and Consequences of Vanishing Trials in Federal
Court, 1 J. EMPiRiCAL LEGAL STUD. 571 (2004); Hadfield, supra note 179; Margo
Schlanger, What We Know and What We Should Know About American Trial Trends, 2006
J. Disp. RESOL. 35.

ComparePaul Butler, The Casefor Trials: Consideringthe Intangibles, I J. EMPIRICAL
627, 629-35 (2004) (emphasizing the important "intangible" value trials
have in society and expressing concern for the vanishing civil trial), with Stephen C.
Yeazell, Getting What We Asked For,Getting What We PaidFor,and Not Liking What We Got:
The Vanishing Civil Trial, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 943, 964-71 (2004) (offering an
"equally plausible" view of the vanishing trial-that it is a natural and desirable sign of
194

LEGAL STUD.

a maturing procedural system).
195

See supra note 184.
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mary judgment rose. 19 6 Parties refusing to settle had to wait slightly
longer for trial, and even longer for bench trial. This disincentive, by
lowering the expected value of a tried judgment, decreased the number of trials. But the disincentive was not enough to reverse the
increase in case filings, and so the cycle continued. More cases came,
of which more ended early and fewer reached trial. The last three
decades' drastic increase in caseload would necessarily correlate with
drastic changes elsewhere in the system, such as the observed drastic
decline in civil trials. But all the changes offset one another, so that
the equilibrium held as far as delay goes. Indeed, the time to termina197
tion for the vast majority of cases stayed level.
In this kind of dynamically interactive system, it makes little sense
to speak of cause and effect. But people do, producing a chorus of
voices identifying an array of causes. 198 Most of those voices stress to
some degree the courts' increasing workload. And in some sense, it is
sound to say that the increase in caseload resulted in the decline of
the civil trial. 199 The number of trials had to decrease, and the num196
197

See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 152-55.

198

See supra note 186.

199 See Diamond & Bina, supra note 184, at 654-57 (observing that the civil trial
rate varies inversely with the civil caseload per judge, while arguing generally that the
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ber of summary judgments had to increase, so keeping the delay in
handling the growing caseload at its natural level. But in another
sense, this cause is illusory. The system could have prohibited summary judgment, for purposes of illustration, and another equilibrium
position would emerge with increased trials and settlements and
decreased filings. Thus, one could speak of the failure to prohibit
summary judgment as the cause of the decline of the civil trial. The
better way to speak is of a dynamically interactive system.
B.

Trial by Jury orJudge

The classic work on jury and judge differences was by Professors
Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel. 200 They addressed the reliability (the
ability to treat like cases alike) of jury decisionmaking, as opposed to
validity (correctness). Their questionnaires to presiding judges in
some 4000 actual state and federal civil jury trials nationwide in the
1950s-asking the judges how they would decide those same cases, a
decision supposedly formulated before the verdict but reported afterwards-yielded data showing a 78% agreement between judge and
jury on liability. 20 1 The rate of agreement is more impressive than it
first appears. The cases that reach trial are close cases. When compared to other human decisionmakers, this 78% agreement rate
proves better than the rate of agreement on dichotomous decisions
between scientists doing peer review, employment interviewers ranking applicants, and physicians diagnosing patients, and almost as good
as the 79% or 80% rate of agreement between judges themselves making sentencing decisions on custody or no custody in an experimental
20 2
setting.
Incidentally, when judge and jury did disagree in the Kalven and
Zeisel study, they exhibited no distinct pattern other than the juries'
perceived lack of the judicial system's capacity rather than the lack of demand by
litigants for trial has driven the civil trial's decline).
200 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (2d ed. 1971); see also

Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the CivilJury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1063-68 (1964)
(comparing jury verdicts and judges' desired outcomes in surveyed trials). For early
reviews of Kalven and Zeisel's study, seeJohn Kaplan, Book Review, 115 U. PA. L. REv.
475 (1967) (reviewing the first edition), and Michael H. Walsh, The American Jury: A
Reassessment, 79 YALE L.J. 142 (1969) (same). See also Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar,
The American Jury at Twenty-Five Years, 16 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 323 (1991) (assessing
The American Jury twenty-five years after its publication).

201

KALVEN

202

& ZEISEL, supra note 200, at 63-64.

See Michael J. Saks, Enhancing and RestrainingAccuracy in Adjudication, LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 243, 246-48 (reporting research by Shari S.
Diamond).
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very small tendency to favor plaintiffs more than judges did. 20 3 The

jury but not the judge found for the plaintiff in 12% of the cases,
while the judge but not the jury found for the plaintiff in 10% of the
204
cases.
A quarter-century later we performed the first large-scale comparison of plaintiff win rates and recoveries in federal civil cases that actually went to trial before either juries or judges. 20 5 Unlike Kalven and
Zeisel, we took case outcomes in the stream going through jury trial
and compared them to outcomes after bench trials, the two streams of
course comprising different cases. The cases all came from sizable
tort and contract categories that clearly involved a choice between jury
and judge trial. 20 6 In two of the most controversial areas of modern
tort law, product liability and medical malpractice, the win rates substantially differ from other categories' win rates and in a surprising
way: plaintiffs in these two areas prevail after trial at a much higher
rate before judges (48%) than they do before juries (28%).20 7 Furthermore, in medical malpractice but not in product liability, the
mean recovery in judge trials is higher than the mean recovery injury
trials. 20 8 These empirical results proved resistant to all simple explanations, such as differences in the size of award explaining differences
20 9
in win rates.
So we considered the results in light of the parties' ability to
select which cases reach jury or judge trial. 210 Lawyers entertain longstanding perceptions of the jury as biased and incompetent, relative to
thejudge. 21 1 There is, however, no actual evidence that juries are relatively biased or incompetent. 212 Those perceptions nevertheless
203 KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 200, at 59.
204 Id. at 64.
205 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124 (1992).
206 See id. at 1136-37.
207 See id. app. A, at 1175.
208 See id. app. B. On the later perceived dangers of using mean recoveries with
the AO data, see Theodore Eisenberg & Margo Schlanger, The Reliability of the Administrative Office of the U.S. CourtsDatabase:An InitialEmpiricalAnalysis, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1455, 1489-90 (2003).
209 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 1140-43.
210 See id. at 1148-57.
211 See id. at 1149-51.
212 See NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES 147-89, 267-338 (2007);
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries,Judges, and Punitive Damages: An EmpiricalStudy, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 743, 779 (2002); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778, 826-27 (2001); Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson,
EmpiricalResearch and CivilJury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1506-11 (2003).
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could have the consequence of a selection of cases reaching jury trial
that differs from the case selection reaching judge trial. In particular,
the theorizing ran that in certain categories of cases such as product
liability and medical malpractice, lawyerk view the jury as relatively
favorable to plaintiffs. They then settle cases in a way that leaves for
trial by jury or judge a residue of what they consider close cases, with
juries accordingly seeing, on average, weaker cases. The perceptions
then turn out to be misperceptions, asjury and judge turn out to perform similarly. 2 13 Thus, the jury produces fewer winners than
expected, while the judge produces more winners.
Our theorizing and analysis led, after a lengthy article based on a
wealth of data covering all sorts of cases, to three conclusions. First,
the most plausible explanation of the data lies in small differences
between judges' and juries' treatment of cases and, much more substantially, in the parties' varying the case selection that reaches judge
and jury. Second, litigants' stereotypical views about juries may lead
them to act unwisely in choosing between judge trials and jury trials.
Third, the surprising win rates in product liability and medical malpractice cases may stem from the especially strong misperceptions litigants hold about judge and jury behavior in these cases. 214 More
simply put, certain groups of plaintiffs do far better before judges, but
the reason likely lies in prevailing misperceptions about juries, rather
than in differences between judges and juries. Judges and juries are
2 15
in fact not so different.
213 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 1156-57.
214 See id. at 1174.
215 Numerous smaller studies give fairly consistent support to our results. See, e.g.,
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury orJudge Trial: Defendants'
Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 125, 144-45 (2001) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Defendants'Advantage] (citing sources); Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 205,
at 1151-55 (same); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Runaway Judges? Selection
Effects and theJury, 16J.L. ECON. & ORG. 306, 329-30 (2000) (similarly attributing most
jury/judge differences to selection effect). The same is true in studies of most specific case categories. See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 1154 n.78
(citing sources); Elizabeth Graddy, Juries and Unpredictability in ProductsLiability Damage Awards, 23 LAw & PoL'v 29 (2001) (comparing judge and jury awards in product
liability cases). Although one commentator concluded that some significant jury/
judge differences do exist, see Kimberly A. Moore, Judges,Juries, and Patent Cases-An
Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 383-408 (2000); Kimberly A.
Moore, Jury Demands: Who's Asking?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 847, 870-75 (2002), that
result seems attributable to the uniqueness of the patent litigation that she studied.
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia or Xenophobia in U.S. Courts?
Before and After 9/11, 4J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 441, 447-51 (2007) [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia I1]; see also Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in
PatentLitigation (pt. 1), 83J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y 791, 821-24 (2001) (citing
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Despite the research that rebuts stereotypes about juries, every
day lawyers and policymakers act on the basis of those old stereotypes.
In general, longstanding misperceptions about the legal system are
not uncommon.2 1 6 But why are such misperceptions about the legal
system so resilient, rather than eventually undergoing correction as
lawyers repeatedly observe the consequences of their misperceptions?
On the particular subject of jury/judge performance, elitist perceptions of a biased and incompetent jury system seem to conform to the
natural order of things and can even be comforting. Persuasive and
accessible empirical evidence to the contrary has been slow in
accumulating. Finally, many lawyers simply prefer to rely on intuition
informed by personal experience and anecdote.2 1 7 All in all, lawyers'
misperceptions of jury/judge differences have understandably prevailed for a long time.
If one were to accept the new empirical evidence, however, practical lessons would emerge. Returning to the same example of product liability and medical malpractice, one could conclude that the jury
is less of an advantage for plaintiffs, and the judge less of a disadvantage, than lawyers think. That realization should affect the terms of
settlement. Moreover, if only one side comes to that realization, that
side could manipulate the jury/judge choice to its bargaining
advantage.
V.

JUDGMENT

A.

Win Rates

As already observed, a popular form of empirical study involves
examining the parties' success in obtaining judgment after litigastatistics indicating judge/jury differences in patent litigation outcomes and suggesting explanations for such differences that are unique to patent cases); cf Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Update, supra note 141, at 130-31 (finding
judges seemingly less favorable than juries in another case category).
216 See Theodore Eisenberg & James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution
in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731, 784-86 (1992); Theodore Eisenberg &
StewartJ. Schwab, What Shapes Perceptions of the Federal Court System?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
501, 501-02 (1989); Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: ContemporaryLegends About the
CivilJustice System, 40 ARiz. L. REV. 717, 717 (1998);James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal
Change, 37 UCLA L. REV. 479, 541 (1990). See generally THOMAS GILOVICH, How WE
KNOW WHAT ISN'T SO (1991); RICHARD NISBETr & LEE Ross, HuMAN INFERENCE
195-296 (1980).
217 See Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 227-51.
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tion. 2 1 8 Not only are such judgment data readily available, but also
they appear to be full of meaning. An analyst might see the win-rate
data as revealing some underlying factor affecting outcome generally,
such as some substantive or procedural rule or some nonlegal factor
favoring one side or the other in the set of all disputes. Yet this interpretive step can easily lead the analyst astray. Because win-rate data
convey the system's output while hiding the variable composition of its
input, win-rate data inherently entail a near-fatal ambiguity that theo2 9
rists call the selection effect. I
More specifically, disputes and cases that clearly favor either the
plaintiff or the defendant tend to settle readily, because both sides can
save costs by settling in light of their knowledge of the applicable law
and all other aspects of the case. Difficult cases falling close to the
applicable decisional criterion tend not to settle, because the parties
are more likely to disagree substantially in their predicted outcomes.
These unsettled close cases fall more or less equally on either side of
the criterion, regardless of the position of that criterion and regardless of the underlying distribution of disputes. Thus, even if, say, a
legal criterion such as strict liability highly favors plaintiffs, one might
not observe a plaintiff win rate well above 50%. Instead, case selection
will leave for adjudication a residue of unsettled close cases, which
consequently exhibit some nonextreme equilibrium win rate.
In other words, the parties' selection of which cases to push into
and through litigation produces a biased sample from the mass of
underlying disputes. This case-selection effect means that the win rate
reveals something about the set of adjudged cases, a universe dominated by close cases-but reveals not much about the underlying, variegated mass of disputes and cases, and indeed little about the
litigation process' treatment thereof. According to case-selection
effect theory, any distinction between two streams of cases that the
parties evaluate without systematic inaccuracy, say, product liability
and medical malpractice, should lead to no difference in adjudicated
win rates. Indeed, under simplifying assumptions, and as a limiting
implication, the theory suggests a trial win rate of 50% for both
streams.
218 See, e.g., supra Part I.B (using win rate data to unearth the forum effect). See
generally Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 19, at 587-92 (cautioning about difficulties inherent in using win rates to generate conclusions about how an underlying
factor affects outcomes generally).
219 See, e.g., Daniel Kessler et al., Explaining Deviationsfrom the Fifty-Percent Rule: A
Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Casesfor Litigation,25 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 235-36
(1996); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputesfor Litigation, 13J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
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Actually, however, the fully developed theory does not predict
any universal win rate, or even that any two streams' rates will be the
same. Reality is too complicated to produce a 50% win rate. There
are three main types of factors that might lead to win rates different
from 50%: differential stakes, parties' misperceptions, and influences
such as case strength that survive because of imperfect case selection.
That last set of influences indeed does mean that win rates may retain
residual meaning, which the settlement process has not obliterated.
Careful research and theorizing can often succeed in untangling the
neutralizing effect of settlement. The challenge is to tease out the
residual meaning in win-rate data.
For example, Professor Eisenberg, Dean Schwab, and I have done
a fair amount of study on employment discrimination litigation, or socalled jobs cases. 220 This is an important category, emerging in the
1970s, and then exploding in the 1990s so that it peaked at almost
10% of the federal civil docket by the end of the decade 22 1-and
accounting for an even bigger percentage of federal civil trials. 222 We
showed that in federal court the plaintiff win rate for jobs cases (15%)
was lower than that for nonjobs cases (51%).223 The win rate in jobs
was consistently low, not only for race and sex discrimination but also
for the various other subtypes such as disability and age discrimination. Over the period of fiscal years 1979-2006, plaintiffs won 28% of
jobs trials, but 45% of nonjobs trials. Plaintiffs injobs cases won 4% of
2 24
judgments that came by pretrial motion, but 21% in nonjobs cases.
What to make of these results? It could be that overly litigious
civil rights plaintiffs start with weak cases and then present them less
effectively than the defendants. But there is no evidence for this theory; in fact, these plaintiffs and their lawyers should have the same
economic disincentives against pressing weak cases, or indeed suing at
all, as do other claimants. Instead, our painstaking review of employment discrimination cases throughout the litigation process, including settlement and appeal, suggested the existence of a legal system
220 See sources cited supra note 141, with results applied supra notes 190, 215, and
infra text accompanying notes 236, 246.
221 Time trends remain key, as the jobs category has seen a startling drop as a
percentage of the docket every year after fiscal year 2001, so that in fiscal year 2006 it
accounted for under six percent of the federal civil docket. The category has
dropped in absolute number of terminations every year after fiscal year 1999. Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination Update, supra note 141, at 104.
222 See Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination,supra note 141, at 432-38.
223 See Clermont & Schwab, Employment DiscriminationUpdate, supra note 141, at
127.
224 See id. at 118, 131-32.
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biased against employment discrimination plaintiffs, making theirs a
tough row to hoe.
B.

ForeignerEffect

Everyone knows that foreigners fare badly in U.S. courts, right?
Well, no, that is not true, according to our research. 225 In fact, foreign plaintiffs suing domestic defendants have enjoyed a higher win
rate (75%) than domestic plaintiffs suing domestic defendants (59%),
in federal diversity actions over the last two decades. 226 Likewise,
domestic plaintiffs suing foreign defendants fare worse (50%) than
domestic plaintiffs suing domestic defendants (59%).227 This foreigner

effect was not specific to certain courts or certain case categories, and
did not depend on the procedural route taken to judgment, but
228
instead prevailed across the board.
Why? Our analysis rejected the implausible notion that U.S.
courts have a pro-foreigner bias, as well as the more plausible explana2 29
tion that foreign parties litigate better than domestic parties.
Instead, it appears that foreigners' fear of U.S. courts lead them to
pursue only an unusually strong set of cases. 230 That is, foreigners are
averse to litigating here and hence are more selective in choosing
strong cases to pursue to judgment. When the foreigners do not
encounter the expected level of bias, they end up winning more of
their cases. So, it is case selection at work.
Accordingly, although we cannot prove that antiforeign bias is
nonexistent in U.S. courts, we can say that the available data do not
support the view that U.S. courts harbor xenophobic bias. The data
instead suggest that foreigners would be wise to lessen their general
aversion to litigation here.
As I said above, however, one must ensure that one sees most
pieces of the puzzle before drawing broad conclusions. It is important
to draw data from a variety of types of fora and locales and a variety of
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109
L. REv. 1120 (1996); Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia II, supra note 215; see
also Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 84
N.Y.U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 37), available at http://ssm.com/
abstract=1257096 (presenting results of an empirical study, which strongly suggests
that choice-of-law decisions are not motivated by judicial biases in favor of domestic
litigants).
226 Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia II, supra note 215, at 456-57.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 225, at 1132-33.
230 See id. at 1133-35.
225

HARV.
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case categories, as well as from a range of years. Here, time trends are
a big part of the story, just as they are elsewhere. 231 Indeed, a recent
and rapid change in time trends shapes the story. 23 2 When we first
wrote on this topic, we had data only through fiscal year 1994, so that
the foreigners' edge appeared sizable. 2 33 We have since taken the
longer view, and have thereby detected that the foreigners' aversion
waxes and wanes with the times and thus creates the pattern seen in
Figure 5.234 As it shows, in the past foreigners substantially outperformed their domestic counterparts in obtaining favorable judgments, but more recently the foreigners' "advantage" has all but
disappeared. Still, the point remains that case selection drives the
outcomes for foreigners, so that the skewed sample of foreigner cases
that reach judgment does not reveal any supposed partiality of the
legal system and hence does not require any of the proffered structural or cultural explanations of xenophobia.2 35
VI.
A.

APPEAL

Affirmance Effect

While win rates in the trial court can be high or low across case
categories, affirmance rates in the appellate court are elevated for all
kinds of cases. Figure 6, now extended in years and focused on my
231 See, e.g., Clermont & Schwab, Employment Discrimination,supra note 141, at 444
fig.9 (showing the decline in plaintiff win rate by pretrial adjudication in all civil
cases); Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia II, supra note 215, at 456 & fig.2, 463 fig.5
(demonstrating downward time trends in diversity plaintiff win rate and in rate of
diversity cases that end in judgment); supra Part I.A (discussing the upward time
trend in removal rate); supra text accompanying notes 120-49 (noting the rise in
summary judgment grants); supra Part IV.A (discussing the decline in trial rate).
232 See, e.g., supra Part L.A (recognizing a sudden reversal in the trend of the
remand rate); supra Part IV.A (describing the leveling off of the ratio of jury trials to
judge trials); supra note 221 and accompanying text (noting the peak in number of
employment discrimination cases).
233 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 225, at 1125. Only since fiscal year 1986 and
only in diversity cases have the AO codes indicated whether the principal parties were
American or foreign.
234 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Xenophilia II, supra note 215, at 456. Figure 5 comes
from the second Xenophilia article, and here replaces a graph showing the steadiness
of damage awards in federal civil trials over the years that appeared in Clermont &
Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 148.
235 Others have looked at just a sliver of the recent years and so have drawn shaky
conclusions. See, e.g., Utpal Bhattacharya et al., The Home Court Advantage in International Corporate Litigation, 50 J.L. & ECON. 625, 650-53 (2007); see also Clermont &
Eisenberg, Xenophilia II, supra note 215, at 450-51, 453-55 (discussing Bhattarcharya
et al., supra).
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FIGuRE 5: DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN WIN RATES IN
FEDERAL DIVERSITY CASES
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running example of employment discrimination, shows these patterns
nicely. 23 6 It uses the federal court data on judgments for plaintiff or

defendant and decisions for appellant or appellee to show rates for
jobs cases and all other civil cases. The lower set of two lines comprises the jobs and nonjobs win rates in district court, each line limited to results at trial so that the win rate can be most meaningful.
Note that the nonjobs win rate over time is fairly steady or maybe
descending, while jobs has a much lower win rate but one that has
been gently increasing over the period. The cluster of two lines near
the top comprises affirnance rates for jobs cases and all other civil
cases, whether tried or not. The affirmance rate for jobs is slightly
higher than nonjobs of late. Jobs cases are usually unsuccessful below,
and the district court's result usually meets affirmance on appeal. As
already mentioned, jobs plaintiffs have a tough row to hoe.
236 Only since fiscal year 1979 do the AO codes indicate which party prevailed by
judgment in the district court. In any event, jobs was an insignificant case category in
earlier years. The affirmance rate, which is the complement of the reversal rate,
means the percentage of appeals that reach a decisive outcome and emerge as
affirmed rather than reversed. I narrowly define "affirmed" as affirmed or dismissed
on the merits. I define "reversed" as reversed, remanded, or modified, in part or

completely.
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The most striking feature about appeals is the high rate of affirmance. 237 Our work in a number of articles shows the affirmance rate
for federal civil appeals to be about 80%.238 At first glance, this affirmance effect may seem unsurprising. One may expect a high affirmance
rate because of frequent appellate deference to the district court's
result. One may even expect a high affirmance rate when review is de
novo, because of the tendency of experts to agree at about a 75%
237 This high number is characteristic of appellate courts with a predominantly
mandatory docket, such as the federal courts of appeals. See Theodore Eisenberg &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Reversal, Dissent, and Variability in State Supreme Courts: The Centrality
ofJurisdictionalSource 2, 8, 15-23, 37-38 (N.Y.U. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
Series, Working Paper No. 08-01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1080563 (finding, by contrast, a 52% reversal rate for state appellate courts with discretionary jurisdiction, and attributing this to the selection effect of judges picking
which cases to hear). Selection effect is more prevalent, and a bigger impediment to
statistical analysis, at the level of the U.S. Supreme Court than for the federal courts of
appeals. SeeJonathan P. Kastellec & Jeffrey R. Lax, Case Selection and the Study ofJudicial Politics, 5J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 407 (2008) (stressing problems in studying the
Supreme Court).
238 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Defendants' Advantage, supra note 215, at 130-34;
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil
Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947, 968-71.
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rate. 23 9 Combining the two expectations based on appellate deference and expert agreement would push one's expected affirmance
rate even higher toward 80%. Appellate judges should and do lean
240
toward affirmance as the usual course.
However, if the high affirmance rate is owing to those deference
and expertise factors, why do the parties not take them into account
and settle all but the close appeals, thereby whittling down that high
affirmance rate? The usual brand of case-selection theory says that
appeals should act like trials. 241 Indeed, under simplifying assumptions, and as a limiting implication, case-selection theorizing would
predict a 50% affirmance rate. That is clearly wrong, as the data prove.
Thus, the persistently elevated affirmance rate suggests that settlement is not very effective at the appellate phase in weeding out clear
cases. After all, if every judgment underwent appeal, one would
expect about an 80% affirnance rate because of reviewer's deference
and because of experts' agreement. In fact, only a fraction of judgments undergo appeal-less than a fifth of decisive judgments, with
less than half of these proceeding all the way to a decisive appellate
outcome 242-and yet one nevertheless still sees an 80% affirmance
rate. It seems as if the parties have chosen to appeal, by whatever
selection method they employ, a set of cases that is not random but
still functions, at least with regard to overall affirmance, as if it were a
random sampling. In sum, case selection might have a very limited
effect in systematically filtering the cases for adjudication on
243
appeal.
239 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 205, at 1153-54.
240 See also Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary
Insights into the "AffirnanceEffect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 357 (2005) (adding political science and psychology explanations of the tendency to affirm); cf Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less)
Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 73-86 (1985) (questioning the worth of appellate courts as

an error-correction device).
241 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Defendants' Advantage, supra note 215, at 132
nn.11-12; supra text accompanying note 219.
242 See Clermont & Eisenberg, Defendants' Advantage, supra note 215, at 130-31,
154 (showing an appeal rate just over 20% for a selection of litigated judgments, and
indicating 11.3% went all the way to affirmance or reversal); Clermont & Eisenberg,
supra note 238, at 951-52, 967 (showing an appeal rate well under 20%, and indicating that 7.4% of all AO judgments go to affirmance or reversal). Both studies used
data from fiscal years 1988-1997.
243 Other evidence seems to confirm a limited effect of case selection on appeal.
See, e.g., supra note 237. Most notably, a rich literature shows that appellate judges'
attitudes (or ideologies) and other factors including case strength do influence success rates. See Jeff Yates & Elizabeth Coggins, The Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and
Litigant Selection Theories: Explaining US. Supreme Court Decision Making, 27 WASH. U.
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Why would that be? Judgment below leaves the winner feeling
vindicated, and the aggrieved loser wanting justice at long last. Something telling emerges in the countless scenes on the evening news in
which losers immediately proclaim on the courthouse steps their
intention to appeal. After slogging through the trial court, the losing
party must see the small cost and effort in appealing as insignificant
when compared to the big return of reversal. Nearly one-fifth of losing parties decide that they might as well stagger to the finish line,
pretty much regardless of the chances on appeal.2 44 Perhaps, then,
the failure to filter out clear-cut appeals is owing to appeals' not being
very costly in relative terms. Simply put, an 80% affirmance rate suggests that the law should consider reform aimed at the efficiency of
forcing the would-be appellant to pause. A possible reform proposal
would involve shifting attorney's fees on appeal to a losing appellant,
which would seem a fair condition of access to a second court for a
245
party already found to be in the wrong.
Beyond such an indirect lesson, it may be that gross appeal rates
and affirmance rates do not have much to tell policymakers, for example, about the quality of first-instance justice. Appeal rates may turn
mainly on the cost of appeal. Affirmance rates may mainly reflect any
selection effects. One must dive much more deeply into the data to
draw meaningful lessons, as I shall next illustrate.
POl'Y (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript 7-13, 19-21, 30-31), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120065. The role of attitudes would be hidden if case
selection were robust on appeal.
For another example, see the state data from the National Center for State
Courts, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/cocoon/NACJD/STUDY/04539.xml,
which
indicate that the affirmance rate when a deferential standard of review governs is
considerably higher than when a nondeferential standard governs. See also FRANK B.
CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 49-53 (2007) (showing indirectly a similar result for the federal courts of appeals, while generally finding that
case strength and judicial attitudes influence affirmance rates for those courts). That
the standard of review should matter is not too surprising, one might respond. But if
case selection were operating, the affirmance rates under different standards of
review should tend to equate. Some evidence goes the other way, however. See Kessler et al., supra note 219, at 254, 256-57 (finding some selection effects on appeal).
244 See supra note 242.
245 See Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 379, 385, 421, 424 (1995) (suggesting a need for increased court fees on
appeal). But see Scott Barclay, Posner's Economic Model and the Decision to Appeal, 19
JUST. Sys. J. 77, 95-96 (1997) (suggesting that taking an appeal is not an economic
decision). Such reform would have the added benefit of lessening the workload of
the appellate courts, a heavy workload having all sorts of deleterious effects on the
appellate function. See Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A LateCentuy View, 38 S.C. L. REv. 411, 428-29 (1987).
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Our research also revealed a surprising plaintiff/defendant difference in the federal courts of appeals. 246 After matching individual
district court cases with their appeals, if any, we could show that
defendants succeed more than plaintiffs on appeal. For example,
defendants appealing their losses after completed trial obtain reversals at a 33% rate, while losing plaintiffs succeed in only 12% of their
appeals from completed trial. 247 Therefore, defendants emerge from
the appellate court in a much better position than when they left the
trial court. Again, the effect is especially pronounced in jobs cases.
Why would this plaintiff/defendant difference exist? This question takes me from fact into speculation. I think that the plaintiffs'
lower reversal rate stems from real but hitherto unappreciated differences between appellate and trial courts. Both our descriptive analyses of the results and our more formal regression models dispelled
explanations based on selection of cases, and instead supported an
explanation based on appellate judges' attitudes toward trial-level
adjudicators. The appellate judges may be acting on their perceptions
of the trial courts as being pro-plaintiff. The appellate court consequently would be more favorably disposed to the defendant than are
the trial judge and the jury.
This appellate favoritism would be appropriate if the trial courts
were in fact biased in favor of the plaintiff. But, as recounted in our
articles, empirical evidence tends to refute trial court bias on the
plaintiff/defendant axis, and so any such appellate judges' perceptions appear increasingly to be misperceptions. Or unconscious
biases may be at work. Perhaps, for example, appellate judges' greater
distance from the trial process creates an environment in which it is
easier to discount harms to the plaintiff. In either event, the data on
appellate leaning in favor of the defendant become a cause for concern. In short, I think we have unearthed an anti-plaintiffeffect in federal appellate courts that is troublesome.
Nevertheless, it merits stressing that we have never claimed that
the attitudinal explanation of the anti-plaintiff effect is irrefutable.
246 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 84JuDICATUR 128, 130 tbl.1 (2000); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Judge HarryEdwards: A Case in Point!, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1275, 1283 (2002);
Clermont & Eisenberg, Defendants' Advantage, supra note 215, at 135; Clermont &
Schwab, Employment Discrimination, supranote 141, at 446-56; Clermont & Eisenberg,
supra note 238, at 952 tbl.1. As to this effect, the state data tell a similar story. See
Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobiain State Courts? An Empirical Study
of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38J. LEGAL STUD. 121 (2009).
247 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 238, at 952 tbl.1.
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What is the best counterargument? It would be that plaintiffs start
with weak cases, and then present them less effectively than defendants. We are looking at output data, after all; by making appropriate
assumptions about the input, one can explain any particular pattern
in the output data. Thus, weak cases, weakly pushed by overly litigious
plaintiffs who also appeal too readily, will mathematically result in a
higher reversal rate for defendants, and so could produce the look of
an anti-plaintiff effect in reversal rates, even before perfectly neutral
courts.

248

My response is that no empirical basis exists for inferring such a
difference between the strength of plaintiffs' and defendants' cases.
Moreover, even if plaintiffs are flooding the district courts with weak
cases, those stalwart few who make it through pretrial, through settlement, and then through to trial victory should at the least have relatively strong cases; these are cases that survived the prefiling and
pretrial screening, and so are nonfrivolous cases with a genuine factual issue; the settlement-litigation process should have weeded out
the lopsided cases, leaving a pool of claims comprising mainly close
cases. Yet these tried cases exhibit a more extreme anti-plaintiff effect
on appeal than do pretrial judgments. This result is strongly inconsistent with any "weak cases produce divergent reversal rates" argument.
Finally, our prior research found the anti-plaintiff effect on appeal
prevails even between corporate parties. Thus, rather than yielding to
the intuitive attraction of the view that plaintiffs are overly litigious, I
tentatively conclude that appellate judges are acting as if it is they who
accept that view. Their resulting attitude then produces at least some
249
of the observed anti-plaintiff effect.
CONCLUSION

The six stories of Litigation Realities now stand renewed. But their
conclusion stays the same: data are good. Or maybe better than ever!
248 See Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases:
FurtherExploration of Anti-PlaintiffAppellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMpiRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659,
677-82 (2004) (strengthening the counterargument by making strong assumptions,
including an assumed but unrealistic selection effect on appeal).
249 See id. at 682-85 (finding a residual attitudinal effect in the data even for the
example of employment discrimination cases with their extremely low win rate).
Appellate/trial court differences in attitude surely have an effect in certain types of
cases. See, e.g., Timothy Davis Fox, Right Back "In Facie Curiae "-A StatisticalAnalysis
ofAppellate Affirmance Rates in Court-InitiatedAttorney-Contempt Proceedings, 38 U. MEM. L.
REv. 1, 2 (2007) ("The affirmance rate for the general appellate case population is in
excess of 70%. The affirmance rate of the 932 court-initiated attorney-contempt
[findings in Westlaw] cases included in this study is only about 32%.").

